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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study was to determine whether 
investment decisions are affected by the way in which 
pension information is presented in financial statements. 
MBA students and financial analysts were asked to estimate 
future stock prices and make purchase recommendations for 
ten cases based on selected sets of accounting and 
financial information. Three different forms of the 
information cue set were used. The pension cue was 
presented in a footnote to the cue set, as a line-item in 
the cue set, which was the equivalent of a balance sheet 
position, or incorporated into the debt/asset ratio. 
Responses were analyzed using analysis of variance in a 
profile analysis framework. in addition, measures of 
subject achievement, oased on the Brunswik lens model, were 
used as dependent variables to determine the effect of cue 
set format and subject er.^ertise on prediction achievement.
The research found evidence that the manner in which 
pension information is presented affects stock price
x
predictions. However, the effect did not carry over to 
subject purchase recommendations. The cue set factor and 
the subject's expertise also affected the ability of the 
subjects to predict stock prices. Subject achievement was 
significantly increased by the placement of pens ion 
information in a balance sheet position, rather than as a 
footnote. The financial analysts outperformed the student 
subjects on all measures of prediction achievement, except 
in the consistency with which they applied a linear model.
However, differences between the studen ts and the f inancia1
analysts was reduced by the use of the pension cue in the
equi valent of a balance shee t position and the ad just ed
debt/asset ratio.
xi
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In December 1985, the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board (FASB) released statement of Financial Accounting 
Standards No. 87, "Employers' Accounting for Pensions," 
(SFAS 87) containing major changes in the treatment of 
pension obligations by sponsors of defined benefit pension 
plans.1 in addition to changes in the measurement of 
pension cost and expanded disclosure requirements, SFAS 87 
requires that an employer recognize a net liability in the 
statement of financial position when his obligation for
*A defined benefit plan 
specifies a determinable pens 
factors such as age, years of 
1985, par. 264).
I
is a pension plan that 
ion benefit, usually based on 
service, and salary (FASB,
accumulated pension benefits exceeds the fair value of 
pension plan assets (FASB, 1985, par. 36).2
The decision to require recognition of a liability for
unfunded pension benefits was very controversial. Some
critics and commentators suggested that recognition would
cause adverse economic consequences by imoairing financial
ratios used by analysts and bankers to judge a company's
leverage and potential for growth (Lucas and Hollowell,
1981; Rue and Volkan, 1984; "Accounting proposal Troubles
Firms," 1985, p. 6). These arguments were based on the
assumption that financial statement users ignored
previously-required footnote disclosures. Other opponents
felt that recognition was unnecessary because pension
information was already available in financial statement
footnotes. They argued that footnote information is as
useful as information recognized in the basic financial
statements (FASB, 1985, par. 116). However, in making its
decision to require some recognition of pension plan assets
and obligations, the FASB rejected the argument that
disclosure in the footnotes of financial statements is as
useful as recognition in financial statements:
Footnote disclosure is not an adequate substitute for 
recognition. The argument that the information is 
equally useful regardless of how it is presented could
2The accumulated benefit obligation is the actuarial 
present value of benefits (both vested and unvested) 
attributed by the pension benefit formula to service before 
a specified date and based on employee service and 
compensation prior to that date (FASB, 1985, par. 264).
3be applied to any financial statement element, but the 
usefulness and integrity of financial statements are 
impaired by each omission of an element that qualifies 
for recognition. Further, although the "equal 
usefulness” argument may be valid for some 
sophisticated users, the Board does not believe it 
holds for all or even most other users, (emphasis 
added) (FASB, 1985, par. 116)
Therf; is little research evidence to confirm or 
refute the FASB’s position that most investors failed to 
incorporate pension disclosures into their decisions, and 
this lack of knowledge on the influence of pension 
disclosures on investment decisions contributed to the 
controversy surrounding standards for pension accounting. 
Therefore, the main purpose of this research was to 
determine the impact of information related to a firm's 
pension plan on individual investment decisions, and 
specifically to determine whether presentation format 
(recognition versus disclosure) affects decisions.
Historical Background 
Accounting for pension plans is a continuing source of 
controversy. Pension costs were originally considered part 
of payroll costs, and not until the late 1920s did plan 
sponsors begin advance recognition of pension costs on an 
actuarial basis (Gibson, 1981, p. 40). In 1948, the 
American institute of Accountants (AICPA) settled a 
controversy in accounting for pension costs by issuing 
Accounting Research Bulletin No. 36, "Accounting for
Annuity Costs Based on Past Service," which required that
pension plan costs be charged to current and future periods 
as an expense rather than charged against stockholders' 
equity as a gratuity. In Accounting Research Bulletin No. 
47, "Accounting for Costs of Pension Plans," (ARB 47) the 
AICPA stated its preference that pension costs be accrued 
over the expected service period of covered employees and 
that past service costs be charged-off over a reasonable 
period (APB 8, par. 3).
Despite the issuance of ARB 47, accounting for the 
costs of pension plans continued to vary widely among 
companies. Recognition of pension costs was generally tied 
to the amount of yearly plan funding, which could vary a 
great deal from year to year (APB 8, par. 4). Accounting 
Principles Board Opinion No . 8, "Accounting for the Cost of 
Pension plans,” (APB 8), issued in 1966, was the basis of 
generally accepted accounting principles for pension costs 
until SFAS 87 was issued. Although APB 8 was criticized 
for allowing the use of a number of actuarial methods to 
measure pension obligations and costs, it was much more 
specific than previous research bulletins, narrowing the 
range of acceptable practices by specifying a limited 
number of allowable actuarial cost methods for determining 
pension costs (Gibson, 1981, p. 41). APB 8 established the 
principle, still followed under current standards, that the 
cost of a pension plan should be accounted for on the 
assumption that the employer will continue to provide
benefits as long as the employer is in business, despite 
the fact that the employer could limit his legal liability 
at the time APB B was issued. APB 8 also placed accounting 
for pension costs on an accrual basis, rather than using 
actual funding of the cost as a criterion for recognition 
(APB 8, par.16).
The FASB's current pension effort began in 1974. The 
passage of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA) changed the legal status of an employer's 
obligation for pension benefits, which had implications for 
accounting disclosures. Evidence of significant unfunded 
pension obligations which were not disclosed in financial 
statements also led to criticism of existing accounting 
standards (FASB, 1982, p. 41). The FASB first focused on 
developing standards for financial reporting by employee 
benefit plans because of the lack of standards in that area 
(FASB 1985, par. 263). Statement of Financial Accounting 
Standards N o . 35, "Accounting and Reporting for Defined 
Benefit Plans" (SFAS No. 35) addressed financial reporting 
by pension plans, but it did not deal with employers' 
accounting for pension costs, plan assets and obligations.
In 1980 the FASB issued Statement of Financial 
Accounting Standards No. 36, "Disclosure of pension 
Information," (SFAS 36) as an interim measure to cover 
financial reporting by plan sponsors. SFAS 36 did not 
change pension accounting requirements significantly, but
6it did increase disclosures by adding three requirements:
(1) the disclosure of the actuarial present value of vested 
and unvested plan benefits, (2) the plan assets available 
for benefits, and (3) the assumed rates of return used to 
determine the actuarial present value of accumulated plan 
benef its.
In 1983 the FASB published its Preliminary Views of 
the Financial Accounting Standards Board on Major Issues 
Related to Employers1 Accounting for Pension and Other 
Postemployment Benefits (referred to hereafter as 
Preliminary Views). in the Preliminary Views, the FASB 
outlined the issues and its position on pension accounting 
by plan sponsors. one of the most significant changes in 
pension accounting proposed was the movement of pension 
liabilities and assets from the footnotes of the financial 
statements to the body of the financial statements. Under 
APB 8, a company was required to recognize a liability for 
prior service cost only when the company was legally liable 
for pension costs in excess of amounts paid or accrued. 3 
However, liabilities were rarely recognized because legal 
liability was not defined in APB 8 and the FASB determined 
that ERISA did not create a legal obligation for unfunded
3prior service cost is the pension cost assigned to 
the years prior to a particular actuarial valuation and 
includes past service cost attributable to service years 
prior to the inception of a pension plan (APB, 1966).
7pension costs that warranted recognition as a liability 
(FASB, 1974, par. 5).
The position taken in the Preliminary Views was 
modified in an Exposure Draft issued in March, 1985 and the 
final standard issued in December, 1965. Under the 
provisions of SFAS 87, a liability (or asset) must be 
recognized if net periodic pension cost exceeds (is less 
than) contributions to the plan (FASB, 1985, par. 35). An 
employer must also recognize an additional liability if the 
accumulated benefit obligation exceeds the fair value of 
plan assets and any previously accrued liability (FASB,
1985, par. 36). The liability must be at least equal to 
the amount of the unfunded accumulated benefit obligation, 
but the employer can also recognize an equal amount as an 
intangible asset provided the amount of the intangible 
asset does not exceed the amount of any unrecognized prior 
service cost. if the additional minimum liability exceeds 
unrecognized prior service costs, the excess is reported as 
a separate component of equity and considered a net loss 
not yet recognized as periodic pension cost (FASB, 1985, 
par . 37 ) .
The liability requirement is effective for fiscal 
years ending after December 15, 1988, although the other 
provisions of SFAS 87 are effective for fiscal years ending 
after December 15, 1986 (FASB, 1985, par. 76). Any 
unrecognized net obligation or asset existing at the date
8of the initial application of SFAS 07 is treated as 
unrecognized prior service cost and amortized over the 
average remaining service period of employees expected to 
receive benefits under the plan (FASB, 1985, par. 77).
Under SFAS 87 an asset is recognized only for 
contributions in excess of periodic pension costs. There 
is no provision for asset recognition of the excess of plan 
assets over the accumulated benefit obligation in employer 
financial statements, although this had been proposed in 
the Preliminary Views. The FASB rejected asset recognition 
because of the added complexity induced by the change. 
However, the FASB asserted its belief that an employer with 
an overfunded plan has a net pension plan asset that meets 
the FASB‘s criteria for recognition (SFAS 87, par. 98, par. 
155 ) .
Legal Background
The FASB justified its position on recognition of 
pension plan assets and obligations with conceptual 
arguments. However, there is also legal justification for 
assuming pension plan obligations and assets have real 
economic consequences for plan sponsors and should, 
therefore, have an effect on investor decisions.
The passage of ERISA in 1974 brought significant 
changes to the corporate pension system, clarifying the 
legal responsibility of an employer to pay employees
9promised benefits. Prior to the passage of ERISA, a 
company could limit its legal liability to the minimum of 
vested benefits or funded benefits in the event of plan 
termination. If pension assets did not cover accrued 
liabilities, plan beneficiaries did not have recourse to 
other company assets (Deptula, 19B3, p. 1000). ERISA 
provided employees with some benefit protection. In 
addition to creating minimum vesting and funding 
requirements for defined benefit plans, ERISA established 
the pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). The PBGC 
ensures that employees receive at least some of their 
vested benefits, even if the pension plan is inadequately 
funded, by promising to pay 100 percent of vested benefits 
subject to a stated maximum.
In essence, ERISA shifted the risk associated with 
underfunded plans to the PBGC. However, the employer did 
not escape a liability for unfunded vested benefits. ERISA 
provided the PBGC with the. power to place a xien with the 
same priority as a federal tax lien on a plan sponsor's 
assets up to thirty percent of the sponsor's net worth, and 
net worth is based on fair market values rather than 
accounting book values (ERISA Sec. 4062 (a)).
Much of the impetus for increased disclosure arose 
from the existence of a large number of plans with 
underfunded benefits (FASB, 1982). However, an increasing 
number of plans now have 100 percent funding of vested
benefits. A Wyatt Company (1984) survey of large pension 
plans showed that the percentage of plans with 100 percent 
or more funding of vested benefits had risen from 
forty-five percent in 1978 to seventy-four percent in 1983. 
Although there is no provision for recognition of a net 
pension asset on an employer's balance sheet, investors are 
increasingly likely to have to evaluate firms in which 
pension plan assets exceed plan obligations.
Viewing excess plan assets as assets of the firm is 
reasonable in light of the increasing number of pension 
plan reversions. Section 4044(d) of ERISA provides that 
residual assets of a defined benefit plan may revert to the 
plan sponsor upon termination of a plan if all liabilities 
to plan participants and their beneficiaries have been 
satisfied (termination or reversion may or may not involve 
establishment of a replacement plan) . The magnitude of the 
assets involved in plan reversions suggests that financial 
statement users might consider excess pension plan assets a 
potential economic resource of the firm. in the six months 
from April 1984 to November 1984, there were fifty approved 
terminations involving approximately $1.2 billion in asset 
reversions, and as of November 30, 1984, there were 
thirty-seven cases, involving approximately $740 million in 
reversions pending PBGC approval (Walker, 1985, p. 66). 
Exxon Corporation is one example of a company terminating a 
plan in order to gain access to excess pension fund assets.
11
In order to terminate the plan, Exxon had to spin-off 
active employees from the original plan and terminate the 
original plan after providing for retired employees. Once 
the spin-off/termination is completed, excess pension fund 
assets will be available for general corporate use ("E'ltxon 
Will Withdraw. . .", 1986, p. 4).
Unresolved issues 
Tne discussion generated in the process of developing 
now standards for employers' accounting for pens Lon plans 
reflects contradictory theories about the usefulness of 
information that is recognized in the basic financial 
statements versus information that is disclosed in 
footnotes. The argument that there is no difference in the 
effects of recognition and disclosure is consistent with 
theories of market efficiency. There is empirical market 
research which suggests that the status of a firm's pension 
plan is reflected in its equity market value (Oldfield,
1977; Feldstein and Seligman, 1981; Daley, 1984). However, 
arguments raising the possibility of adverse economic 
consequences assume that investors have ignored footnote 
disclosures related to pension plans and that recognition 
would change decisions ("Accounting Proposal Troubles 
Firms," 1985, p. 6). Critics of recognition also expressed 
concern with possible asset recognition for overfunded 
plans, noting asset recognition might make companies more
12
likely targets for acquisition ("Pension Scoreboard," 1984, 
p. 160). Such arguments are inconsistent with the theory 
of market efficiency. However, the operation of an 
aggregate efficient market does not deny that naive 
decision making can occur on an individual level (Ashton, 
1982, p. 116). Very little is known about the aggregation 
of individual choice behavior into a market effect.
According to some proponents of market level research, 
there are factors at the market level which are difficult 
to simulate in individual level research, such as competing 
information sources and user interactions. Therefore 
theories of market behavior and theories of individual 
behavior can be very different (Gonedes and Dopuch, 1974; 
American Accounting Association, 1977, p. 19). There is no 
consensus on a single paradigm to serve as a basis for 
making accounting policy, but in setting accounting policy 
for pensions, the FASB appeared concerned with improving 
individual investor behavior, rather than whether pension 
information is impounded in aggregate market prices.
The FASB suggested that although some sophisticated 
analysts might modify their evaluations of financial state­
ments to reflect the impact of accompanying pension disclo­
sures, most investors focus only on the body of the 
financial statements. Therefore, their decisions are less 
than optimal, relative to sophisticated analysts (FASB 
1985, par. 116). In theory, the FASB's proposed changes in
13
pension accounting will improve the decisions of the 
average investor relative to the professional analyst by 
removing one source of the professional analyst's 
advantage. However, at present there is insufficient 
research evidence to provide a basis for generalizations on 
individual differences in the abilities of sophisticated 
and unsophisticated users to combine various types and 
amounts of accounting information such as pension 
disclosures into their decision making.
Purpose of the study 
The research was designed to investigate whether the 
format of pension disclosures affects users' abilities to 
incorporate the information into stock price predictions.
The study also examined differences in the relative 
abilities cf professional analysts and less sophisticated 
users to incorporate pension information into their 
decisions. The primary research question addressed in the 
study w as:
1. Are individual investment decisions
affected by the form in which pension 
information is presented?
The FASB implied in its discussion of SFAS 87 that the
change in pension reporting would improve the decisions of
naive financial statement users relative to the decisions
of sophisticated users (FASB, 1985, par. 116).
Information on a company's pension plan assets and
14
obligations was presumed to be useful to financial decision 
makers, but the FASB suggested that only the most 
sophisticated financial statement users were actually 
integrating footnote information into their decisions, 
thereby enjoying an advantage over less knowledgeable 
investors. The relative advantage of professional analysts 
over more naive investors could be caused by a number of 
factors such as education, experience, and early access to 
information. whether that relative advantage can be 
lessened by a change in financial reporting has not been 
established. Therefore, a secondary issue considered was:
2. Will a change from footnote disclosure of
pension information to balance sheet recognition 
improve the decisions of naive decision makers 
relative to the decisions of professional 
analysts?
Methodology
Two aspects of investment decisions were examined: 
stock price predictions and purchase recommendations.
Because the FASB indicated that it believed that there 
might be differences in the abilities of sophisticated 
analysts and most other users to incorporate pension 
disclosures into their decisions, responses of professional 
financial analysts and naive investors, represented by 
graduate business students, were analyzed. Subjects were 
provided with accounting and financial data for actual 
companies and asked to make ex post stock price estimates
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and purchase recommendations in an experimental setting. 
Subjects received one of three information sets: an 
information set including current pension disclosures in 
footnote form, an information set in which the net pension 
plan asset or obligation was presented as the equivalent of 
a balance sheet item, or an information set in which 
corporate leverage was adjusted directly for the effect of 
pension plan recognition.
Responses were analyzed using a methodology based on 
the Brunswik lens model (Brunswik, 1952, 1956). The lens 
model allows judgments to be modeled in a situation of 
individual uncertainty about the relationship of 
information cues and events. Uncertainty is typical in an 
investment decision because a decision maker is presented 
with an array of financial and accounting data which are 
unlikely to be perfect predictors of the risk and return of 
a common stock (Libby, 1981, p. 4).
The lens methodology requires a simplification of the 
information available in the real world decision 
environment, but simplification is necessary if decision 
making is to be described in a repetitive situation within 
the constraints of a field experiment. Under ideal condi­
tions, subjects could be presented with complete financial 
statements for a number of companies and the lens 
methodology used to model decision making with a complete 
set of cues. Unfortunately, time requirements for the task
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would probably severely limit the response rate of 
professional analysts. Even studies using a process 
tracing methodology have omitted some parts of the 
financial statements because of difficulties in observing 
information usage with the full set of information 
available to financial analysts (Biggs, 1984; Bouwman,
1984) .
Contr ibut ions
Empirical market research suggests that the status of 
a firm's pension plan is reflected in its equity market 
value (Oldfield, 1977; Feldstein and Seligman, 1981; Daley, 
1984), However, there is no evidence on the ability of 
individuals to incorporate successfully pension disclosures 
into personal estimates of common stock price performance.
For example, individuals may have difficulty incorporating 
the information into their decision models if they are 
uncertain of the cash flow implications associated with 
plan sponsorship. The research was designed to determine 
not only whether investment decisions are affected by the 
recognition versus disclosure of pension information, but 
also whether recognition is a "useful" change in the sense 
of improving users' abilities to predict stock prices. 
Professional analysts, whom the FASB presumed were able to 
incorporate footnote disclosures into their decisions, were 
used as one group of subjects. If the results of this
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research are inconsistent with market studies and the 
format of the pension information affects investment 
decisions of professional analysts, research on the effects 
of accounting policy may have to deal with the behavior of 
individual investors, not just aggregate market behavior, 
given the FASB's concern with investment decisions at the 
individual level.
The research tests the effect of recognition versus 
disclosure of a net pension asset as well as a net 
obligation, SFAS 87 does not require recognition of a net 
pension asset, so financial statement users will still have 
to refer to financial statement footnotes when the new 
standard is implemented for information on a firm's pension 
plan position if the plan is overfunded. Research evidence 
as to whether information in footnotes affects investment 
decisions in the same way as balance sheet items is 
relevant to understanding the possible effect on decision 
making of the inconsistent treatment of net pension assets 
and obligations found in SFAS 87.
The FASB has based its position on pension 
accounting on the perceived needs of nonprofessional 
analysts. Presumably, professional analysts can do a 
better job than naive investors in evaluating companies 
with respect to potential price appreciation. Their 
superiority could come from a number of sources: 
experience, training, access to informat ion unavailable to
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a n a i v e  investor. However, at present there is little 
evidence on differences between sophisticated analysts and 
relatively unsophisticated users with respect to their use 
of accounting information. The proposed research is also 
intended to provide a baseline by comparing sophisticated 
and unsophisticated subjects' abilities to use different 
forms of accounting information as a basis for stock price 
predictions and to identify differences in their investment 
decisions. This study can contribute to an understanding 
of the extent to which professional analysts have a 
superior ability, when compared to more naive subjects, to 
combine publicly available financial and accounting 
information to forecast future stock price performance.
The research will also be useful as input for sampling 
decisions in future studies on the processing of financial 
information. Evidence of a lack of differences between 
student subjects as naive investors and professional 
analysts in a task of financial decision making would lend 
support to research using more readily available student 
subjects in studies on the use of financial and accounting 
informat ion.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
There are three areas of research which pertain to the 
study of the impact of pension information on investment 
decisions: (1) human information processing St.; lies on
financial decision making which have used the lens metho­
dology, (2) market studies on the effect of unfunded 
pension obligations on firm values, and (3) behavioral 
studies on the usefulness of pension disclosures. This 
chapter discusses research studies in each of the three 
areas, and also provides a brief review of lens model 
theory and the financial theory underlying the market 
studies.
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Studies on Financial Decisions 
bsing the Lena Methodology
The Lens Model
The Brunswik lens model (Brunswik, 1952, 1956) 
provides a well-developed theoretical framework in which to 
test hypotheses about information usage and provides a 
basis for modeling decision processes (Ashton, 1982, p. 7).
In the lens model representation of judgment, an individual 
has a set of information cues available (x^, X2 , . . xn )
which can be used to make predictions (Ys) about a
criterion variable, Ye. Normally, a subject's ability to 
predict or estimate ye will be limited by the imperfect 
relationship existing between Ye and the information cues. 
Even if the relationship between Ye and the cue set is 
perfect, Ye and Ys will not be identical if the subject 
does not weigh the cues optimally relative to the 
environmental model or fails to follow a decision model 
cons i stent1y .
Multiple regression analysis is used with standardized 
variables to derive the following predictions:
A
Ye * k®l^l + be2X2 + * • • + benXn (1)
Ys * bs^Xi + bS2X2 + . . . + bsnXn (2)
A
Where: Ye - optimal prediction of Ye
A
Ys » optimal prediction of Ys
bei, bSi , regression weights
Xn * cue n in standardized form
The values Ye, Ys, Ye and ys can be used with 
correlation analysis to measure a subject's ability to 
predict an environmental event of interest. The 
multivariate relationship between the cues and the 
criterion event can be measured as the correlation (Re) 
between Ye and the prediction of Ye based on the least 
squares regression model. This measure of environmental 
predictability indicates the relevance of the cue set in 
predicting the environmental event (Libby, 1981, p. 20). 
The subject's understanding of the environmental 
relationship between the cues and Ye is measured as the
A A
multiple correlation between Ye and Ys, usually designated 
G. The multiple correlation of Ys and the optimal linear 
prediction of Ys yields the coefficient Rs, a measure of 
the consistency with which a subject uses the judgment 
policy implied by the multiple regression equation.
Overall subject achievement is measured as the correlation 
(Ra) between Ye and Ys.
Slovic (1969)
Slovic's 1969 study was an early application of the 
lens methodology to information processing in financial 
analysis, and was primarily intended to illustrate the 
usefulness of the model in a financial decision framework. 
The purpose of the paper was to test the adequacy of ANOVA 
to describe a stockbroker's use of information in the
evaluation of a company's stock. Brunswik recommended the 
use of a "representative experimental design" in which 
real world relationships (correlations) among cues were 
maintained (Brunswik, 1955; Hammond, 1955, p. 261).
However, Slovic used a systematic design in which cues were 
assigned dichotomous values (e.g. good, bad; up, down). 
Results were analyzed using analysis of variance (ANOVA). 
Slovic was especially interested in testing for evidence of 
configurational processing, in which the interpretation of 
an item of information depends on the values of other 
available information. In an ANOVA model, significant 
interaction terms can be interpreted as evidence of 
configural processing.
The sample was restricted to two stockbrokers who 
evaluated 128 companies based on eleven cues in a 
one-sixteenth replication of a 211 factorial design. The 
subjects were asked to make a purchase recommendation on a 
nine-point scale for each company based on their judgment 
of the likelihood of substantial stock price appreciation 
in the next six to twelve months. Cue selection was based 
on one subject's recommendation. Cues represented a 
combination of technical indicators, such as resistance and 
support levels, and income statistics.
Slovic performed separate ANOVAs on each broker's 
judgments to test for the significance of individual cues 
and interaction terms. Slovic found the two brokers
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differed a great deal in their decisions and cue reliance, 
although there was no measure of the statistical 
significance of the differences. He attributed these 
differences to the fact that one broker considered himself 
a technical analyst while the other broker's pattern of cue 
reliance indicated an orientation toward fundamental 
analysis (i.e. reliance on traditional income indicators). 
There was some evidence of configural processing for both 
brokers primarily associated with their use of technical 
indi cator s .
Slovic, Fleissner, and Bauman (1972)
Slovic, et a l . characterized their 1972 study ". . .
as a methodological i11ustration--not a finished empirical 
investigation" (Slovic, et al ., 1972, p. 283 ). The exper­
iment was designed to illustrate the use of the ANOVA 
technique to quantitatively describe the use of information 
in investment decisions. The study is very similar to 
Slovic's 1969 study, but more subjects participated and the 
cue set was slightly different.
The subjects were thirteen stockbrokers and five MBA 
students who were asked to evaluate 64 hypothetical stocks 
for potential capital appreciation based on eight 
information cues. Cues consisted of three technical 
indicators, three income statistics, and two predictive 
indicators for the industry and the company. The cues 
values were dichotomous. Companies used as test cases were
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constructed by combining the cues in a one-fourth 
replication of a 2^ factorial ANOVA design.
Detailed judgment models were presented in the data 
analysis for only two subjects in order to show that 
subjects' reliance on different cues can result in very low 
agreement between brokers' ratings of the same stock 
(multiple correlation of only 0.26 for the two brokers 
analyzed). An index of the overall importance of a given 
factor was calculated for each subject and the index was 
used to compare the subjects. There were substantial 
individual differences in the use of various factors, and 
brokers exhibited more disagreement with one another than 
did students. slovic, et a l . attributed the greater 
agreement among students to the fact that they were just 
completing the same course in security analysis. No 
statistical evaluation of similarities or differences 
between the two groups’ evaluations of the hypothetical 
companies was provided.
Subjects were also asked to provide subjective weights 
reflecting the importance of each cue to their decisions. 
Overall, brokers displayed much less insight into their 
decision process than did students. The correlation 
between subjective and computed effects, across brokers, 
was only 0.34 while the correlation across students was
0.79. Slovic, et al . suggest the results may mean 
experience reduces self-awareness of skilled behavior.
25
Savich (1977)
Savich also characterized his 1977 study as 
exploratory. The purpose of the experiment was to discover 
which accounting data are utilized over other accounting 
data and to relate information usage to the decision styles 
described by Driver and Mock (1975). Savich tested for a 
relationship between decision style and the amount of data 
a subject processes. He also examined subjects' 
self-insight into their decision processes.
The experiment was conducted with 26 student subjects 
who were first categorized into one of four decision styles 
(i.e. Decisive, Flexible, Hierarchic, or integrative) based 
on responses to a standardized test. Savich hypothesized 
that students who were classified in decision styles which 
normally process large amounts of data in decision making 
would use more accounting data in the experimental task.
The subjects were asked to make buy or sell decisions on a 
nine point scale for sixty-four hypothetical companies 
based on eight information cues in a one-fourth replication 
of a 2® factorial ANOVA design. The data elements used 
were the minimum information requirements of APB Opinion 
No. 28 for financial reports. The students were also asked 
to allocate points to the variables based on their 
perception of the overall importance of each variable to 
their decisions in order to test an hypothesis on 
perception versus actual use of information.
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Subject responses were analyzed using step-wise 
multiple regression, and the F-statistic was used to select 
significant variables for each subject. The subjects, 
overall and in decision style groups, tended to use only 
five variables (sales, net income, fully diluted and 
primary earnings per share, and changes in financial 
pos it i on) .
Results as to the effect of decision style on informa­
tion usage were inconclusive. Pairwise comparisons were 
made between the means of the number of significant 
variables for each group. Both Decisive and Flexible 
decision makers were hypothesized to use less information 
than Hierarchic and Integrative groups, but only Decisive 
decision makers showed a significant difference in the 
average number of variables used in their decisions.
Overall the correlation between the students' 
subjective weights of the importance of the decision 
variables and their actual weights was 0.92. The student 
subjects displayed high self-insight into their decision 
processes, leading Savich to conclude that variables not 
utilized were not perceived to be important or necessary to 
perform the experimental task.
McGhee, Shields, and Birnberg (1978)
McGhee, et a 1 . used the same information cues as those 
in the Savich study to determine whether two personality
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variables, decision style and tolerance for ambiguity, were 
related to information processing in an investment 
decision. Student subjects were classified according to 
their decision style and tolerance for ambiguity, and were 
then asked to make investment recommendations for 64 
hypothetical companies on an eight-point scale. McGhee, et 
a l . first measured the range in which the subject thought 
his recommendation would fall and then had the subject make 
a final investment recommendation for each company.
Subjects also rated their confidence in their 
recommendations and specified the amount of additional 
information they would require to achieve a one step higher 
confidence rating. McGhee, et a l . hypothesized that in an 
ambiguous environment, subjerts who were intolerant of 
ambiguity would be less confident in their judgments and 
seek more information to increase their confidence than 
subjects classified as tolerant of ambiguity. With respect 
to decision style, McGhee, et a ] . hypothesized that 
multiple solution processors would consider more 
alternatives than single solution processors and maximal 
data users would use more information than minimal data 
users.
Linear response models were developed for each 
subject. ANOVA was used to test for differences between 
personality types in the mean number of solutions 
considered, confidence rating, additional information
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required and recommendations. None of the hypotheses on 
the relationship of personality and information processing 
were supported. The results were consistent with the 
psychological studies the authors reviewed in which there 
was little evidence that personality alone can account for 
much of the variance in a decision maker's behavior.
Wright (1977 ) (1979 )
The preceding studies focused on the subject response 
side of the lens model without attempting to model 
environmental relationships between a cue set and an 
objective criterion event. However, Wright's 1977 and 1979 
studies investigated financial decisions using the full 
lens model. Subjects were asked to make stock price 
predictions for actual companies and their accuracy was 
measured relative to an environmental linear model.
The purpose of the 1977 study was to provide 
descriptive evidence on the use of accounting numbers in 
personal financial judgments. Student subjects made e_x 
post price change estimates for sixty common stocks over 
the period mid-March 1970 to mid-March 1971 based on the 
mid-March 1970 price and six other accounting and capital 
market cues. Achievement (Ra) was significant for only 
forty percent of the subjects. However, the results may be
due to the very low explanatory power of the environmental 
regression model. The coefficient of determination 
(R-squared) was only 0.34 for a model describing price
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change in dollars and 0.24 for a model describing price 
change in percentages.
A one-sample runs test was used to check for 
randomness in mean judgments for the sixty securities. The 
only cognitive bias detected was a tendency to overestimate 
the prices of the relatively low-priced securities. There 
was no indication of bias for the relatively high-priced 
stocks.
In Wright's 1979 study student subjects were again 
required to provide price change estimates for fifty common 
stocks based on four information cues. subjects were 
classified into two groups based on their number of years 
in an MBA program. Hypotheses tested related to response 
accuracy, the extent of interjudge agreement, subject 
self-insight, and the performance of aggregate response 
models. In contrast to the 1977 study, subject responses 
were evaluated for consistency and for performance relative 
to the limitations of the environmental model.
The lens model was used to describe group information 
processing as well as individual subject behavior. Overall 
subjects displayed moderate consistency (median Rs of 0.53 
and 0.62 for the two groups). Overall achievement was low 
(median Ra of 0.20 and 0.31 for the two groups), but as in 
Wright (1977), environmental predictability was low 
(R-squared was only 0.35). When subject accuracy was 
evaluated relative to the limitations of the environmental
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model, a substantial proportion of the subjects achieved a 
statistically significant performance, indicating a general 
understanding of environmental relationships. Prediction 
accuracy was also significant when individual price change 
estimates were combined into aggregate judgir. . t models (Ra 
of 0.32 and 0.38 for the two groups). Inter judge agreement 
was measured as the correlation of judgments of one 
individual in a group with the judgments of the other 
members of the group. There was only moderate agreement 
among subjects, but the more advanced MBA students 
displayed a higher median interjudge correlation. The more 
knowledgeable subjects also displayed a statistically 
significant higher degree of self-insight into their 
judgment processes.
Larcker and Lessig (1983)
The primary relevance of the Larcker and Lessig study 
to the current research is that it provides evidence of 
convergent validity between cue importance measures 
obtained from the lens (linear model) approach and 
retrospective process tracing, which is often advocated as 
an alternative for judgment modeling. Therefore, the study 
provides methodological support for interpreting judgment 
modeling results in a substantive manner.
The information cues used by Larcker and Lessig were 
similar to Wright (1977). Subjects were thirty-one faculty 
members and MBA students specializing in accounting or
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finance, who were asked to evaluate stocks of fifty 
companies for possible purchase. A linear discriminant 
model was developed for each subject in order to predict 
the subjects buy/no-buy decisions. subjects also provided 
a retrospective verbal report of their decisions 
immediately after evaluating the stocks. The verbal report 
was used to develop a diagrammatic representation of the 
manner in which the six cues were combined.
A large percentage of the actual buy/no-buy decisions 
could be predicted correctly by both the retrospective and 
process tracing models, but the retrospective process 
tracings were significantly higher in correct predictions 
based on a matched pairs t-test for differences in means. 
However, the correlation between linear model and 
retrospective tracing measures was significant. The 
frequency of cue occurrence in the tracing was positively 
related to the absolute value of the standardized canonical 
coefficient, and cue depth (the order in which cues are 
processed) was negatively related to the absolute value of 
the standardized canonical coefficient. Larcker and Lessig 
also used cross-validation samples to test the reliability 
of the linear models. Their results suggested that the 
linear models were generally reliable and that standardized 
cue coefficients obtained in linear models of decision 
making are not merely a statistical artifact of the sample 
selected for estimation purposes.
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Summary of Lens Model studies
Studies using the lens model to describe financial 
decision making have been primarily descriptive in order to 
demonstrate the appropriateness of the methodology. Use of 
the model to test formal hypotheses has been somewhat 
restricted. Many of the studies relied on an orthogonal 
design and were unable to use the full lens model.
Wright (1979, p. 82) has summarized some of the 
limitations of studies which use orthogonal designs. if 
cue sets do not reflect environmental correlations, 
cognitive models lacking external validity may be used by 
subjects. Although Wright’s studies used real data 
relationships, there was no theoretical basis for cue 
selection. Subjects were asked to make decisions using a 
set of variables which displayed a low linear relationship 
to the environmental event. The market studies described 
in the following section provide a basis for selecting a 
set of accounting and financial market cues which the 
studies show have had a significant empirical relationship 
to the environmental event of interest, market equity 
values.
Harket Studies
Although the empirical work on the effect of unfunded
pension obligations on the value of a firm has not been 
extensive, there have been some studies on the effect of
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unfunded pension obligations on the market value of 
corporate shares. Generally, these studies have been based 
on the theories of Miller and Modigliani (1958, 1963) and 
Hamada (1969) which state that equity investors receive a 
higher return on equity investments in levered firms as a 
premium for increased financial risk. Miller and 
Modigliani (1963) modeled the cost of equity capital (ke)
as :
ke » p + (1 - tc )(p - r)D/S (3)
Where: p * discount rate for an all equity firm
tc * corporate income tax rate
r = interest rate on debt
D/S * ratio of the market values of debt to 
equity
Equation (3) implies that the required rate of return 
on equity investments increases linearly with changes in 
the market value ratio of the debt to equity. Equation (3) 
can be restated to show that the inclusion of debt in the 
capital structure of a firm reduces the market value of the 
firm*s common stock equity (Miller and Modigliani, 1963, 
p. 439):
S - V - D = [E (X )/p ] - [(1 - tc )((p - r)/p)]D (4)
Where: s  * market value of the firm equity
V * market value of the firm
D - market value of the firm debt
E(X) * expected net profits after taxes
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If unfunded pension obligations are considered a 
corporate liability, then equity investors should receive a 
risk premium for investing in companies with unfunded 
pension obligations, and the presence of unfunded pension 
obligations should reduce the market value of a common 
stock. To the extent that benefits are unfunded, pension 
recipients have a claim on corporate earnings and that 
claim should be reflected in the market value of the firm's 
common stock. Conversely, stock prices should be higher 
for firms with overfunded pension plans if plan assets are 
considered a component of the market value of the firm, 
although this has not been tested because empirical test 
periods have pre-dated the emergence of large numbers of 
overfunded plans.
Oldfield (1977)
Oldfield (1977) provided the earliest study on the 
effect of unfunded pension obligations on common stock 
values. Oldfield modified Miller and Modigliani's model 
for determining the value of a firm's securities as the sum 
of its discounted cash flows to include an unfunded vested 
pension obligation. A cross-secticnal regression was then 
run on 166 firms using 1974 data.
Oldfield found that the coefficient of unfunded vested
pension obligations divided by the book value of firm
assets was significantly negative over the sample of 166 
firms (the coefficient was -1.692, significant at 0.05) and
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within 1.5 standard deviations of minus one, which was the 
result anticipated if every dollar of unfunded vested 
pension benefits reduces the market equity value of the 
firm by one dollar. He concluded that the reported book 
value of unfunded vested benefits was a fairly accurate, 
but understated, representation of the true pension 
obligation.
Gersovitz (1980)
Oldfield ignored the possible effect of the limitation 
of sponsor liability to 30 percent of net worth or the 
amount of the unfunded pension benefit, whichever is 
smaller, effected by ERISA. Gersovitz (1980) developed an 
econometric model which categorized firms into two 
groups —  those with unfunded vested pens ion obiigations less 
than or equal to 30 percent of net worth, and those with 
unfunded vested pension obligations of more than 30 percent 
of net worth. Net worth was estimated as the year-end 
value of outstanding common shares obtained from the 
Compustat tapes. Data was analyzed in a nonlinear 
regression model because the dependent variable was 
included on both sides of the equation. Using a sample of 
217 firms, Gersovitz found an equity market value decline 
of $2.25 for every one dollar increase in unfunded vested 
benefits as long as the total liability for unfunded vested 
benefits was less than 30 percent of net worth. Once the 
level of unfunded vested benefits exceeded 30 percent of
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net worth, a one dollar increase in unfunded vested 
benefits increased market value by $2.76. Gersovitz also 
showed he could obtain results consistent with Oldfield's 
study by using a simple model that ignored the size of 
unfunded vested benefits relative to the market value of a 
company's equity.
Gersovii interpreted his results as an indication 
that the market believes unfunded vested benefits have been 
systematically understated in financial statements and that 
liabilities above some discrete level do ot diminish the 
value of a firm's shares. This effect seems to be 
associated with the PBGC's 30 percent rule.
Feldstein and Seligman (1981)
Feldstein and Seligman (1981) also examined the effect 
of pension funding on share prices, although their primary 
concern was with the effect of private pension plans on 
aggregate saving. Feldstein and Seligman interpreted a 
promise of pension benefits as a substitution for current 
wages:
If this substitution of promised benefits for current 
wages is not funded, accounting profits rise. If 
shareholders do not recognize the future obligation, 
they will incorrectly interpret the rise in current 
income as an increase in permanent income and will 
raise their own consumption. (Feldstein and Seligman, 
1981, p. 803).
If the share price is reduced to reflect the unfunded
pension obligation, shareholders have an incentive to
37
maintain their current consumption level, even if corporate 
profits increase.
Although Feldstein and Seligman used unfunded vested 
benefits in their empirical analysis, they discussed 
sources of measurement error which prevent reported 
unvested pension benefits from being the equivalent to an 
equal value of debt. For the pension obligation to be 
correctly valued, the following factors must be considered: 
(1) the tax deductibility of pension expenses; (2) the 
discount rate used for combined benefits at different 
dates; (3) the distinction between vested and actuarially 
expected benefits; (4) the impact of inflation.
A sample of 117 manufacturing firms for 1976 and 193 
firms for 197/ was used to test the impact of a number of 
variables, including unfunded vested pension benefits, on 
the total market value of the firm and the equity of the 
firm using multiple regression models. Results showed that 
each dollar of unfunded liability reduced firm value by 
SI.44 in 1977 and $1.87 in 1976 (standard errors of 0.47 
and 0.79 respectively). These results implied the reported 
unvested pension benefit understates the true liability.1
Parameter estimates for the equity value equations 
were consistent with those of the market value equations.
For 1977, the coefficient of the unvested pension benefit
J-Tne authors noted that while the coefficient was 
statistically significant, it was compatible with minus one 
as well as much larger values.
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was -1.23 with a standard error of 0.40, and in 1976 the 
coefficient was -1.84 with a standard error of 0.69.
Feldstein and Seligman interpreted the results as 
consistent with the view that equity holders regard the 
stated value of unfunded pension benefits as the most 
likely value and reduce their offer price accordingly.
Feldstein and Seligman also ran the regression model 
adding the value of unfunded liabilities based on past and 
prior service costs as independent variables. in both the 
market value and the equity value equations, the unfunded 
past and prior service liability had a coefficient that was 
only a small fraction of its standard error, and 
introducing past and prior service liability into the 
market value equation actually raised the standard error of 
the other coefficients. Feldstein and Seligman interpreted 
these results as evidence that the market ignores unfunded 
prior and past service cost, even though their other 
results suggested unfunded vested benefits are an 
understatement of a company's total pension obligation. As 
Stone notes, these findings are consistent with the fact 
that unfunded prior service costs are often computed using 
different actuarial methods and are therefore not 
comparable. Introducing prior service costs into the model 
introduces additional noise because of the lack of
comparability, and explanatory power is decreased. (Stone, 
1982 , p. 18 ) .
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Daley (1984)
Daley (1904) extended previous research by examining 
the effect of pension expense as a measure of pension cash 
flows on equity prices. A cross-sectional equity 
valuation model was used to assess the consistency of 
pension expense, unfunded vested benefits, and unfunded 
past and prior service costs as pension cost estimates 
impounded in market security prices. The model was tested 
on 153 firms for the period 1975 through 1979.
All three measures of pension cash flows yielded 
statistically significant negative coefficients, suggesting 
the market incorporated some measure of pension costs into 
stock prices. The measures were then evaluated to 
determine which was most consistent with its theoretically 
predicted value. Daley adjusted unfunded vested benefits 
and unfunded prior service cost by (1 - tc ), where tc is 
the corporate marginal tax rate, to better estimate pension 
cash flows. The magnitude of the coefficient of unfunded 
service cost was almost always less than the expected value 
of minus one, suggesting the measures understate the 
after-tax costs of future pension cash flows. Results of 
the estimation process using unfunded vested pension 
benefits, and unfunded prior service costs were consistent 
with prior research when those results were adjusted to 
reflect tax effects of plan contributions. However,
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Daley’s results suggest pension expense is more consistent 
with the market valuation process as a measure of pension 
cost.
Summary of Market Studies
Market research suggests that security prices are 
adjusted to reflect the future cash flow effects of 
sponsoring defined benefit pension plans. Studies of the 
effect of unvested pension benefits (with and without 
adjustments for tax effects of contributions) have found 
that the market appears to treat unfunded vested benefits 
as an understatement of a firm's liability. However,
Daley’s results suggest market participants may be using 
pension expense as a measure of the future obligation of a 
plan sponsor. None of the studies deal with the effect of 
overfunded pension plans on the value of a firm because 
overfunding was a relatively infrequent occurrence in the 
years for which data was gathered.
Research on the Usefulness of Pension 
Disclosures to individuals
The two methods most widely used to determine how
accounting information is used in financial analysis are
questionnaires and modeling of individual decision
processes, typically using the lens model, to determine
which pieces of information are used and their relative
importance. However, published research to date provides
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little insight into the use of pension information in 
security analysis.
There have been a number of questionnaire studies of 
security analysts. Subjects were usually presented a list 
of information items and asked to rate the items as to 
their importance in decision-making. Only limited 
inferences can be based on the results of these studies 
because the questionnaire approach assumes that subjects' 
self- insights into their personal decision-making are 
accurate. Some studies did not even include pension 
disclosures as a possible information item, perhaps because 
they predated the expanded disclosure requirements of SFAS 
No. 36 (for example, Benjamin and Stanga 1977).
Two early studies by Buzby (1974) and Chandra (1974) 
included the amount of past pension fund liability, if 
material, as an information item (thu only disclosure 
requirement of APB Opinion No, 8). Buzby asked analysts to 
rate thirty-eight financial and non-financial items based 
on their degree of importance for inclusion in an annual 
report and Chandra requested ratings on fifty-eight items.
The analysts in Buzby's study rated pension information as 
having intermediate importance (mean rating of 2.88 on a 
four-point scale), while those in Chandra's study rated 
pension disclosures as important (a mean rating of 4.03 on 
a five-point scale). As Frishkoff, et a l . (1984, p. 48)
point out, no costs were attached to information
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acquisition and analysts rarely indicated they were less 
than neutral about any information item. Therefore, the 
results of these studies provide little insight into the 
use of information items in an actual investment decision.
Frishkoff, et a l . (1984) provide limited evidence on
the use of pension information by financial analysts. 
Frishkoff, et a l . used protocol analysis to study the use 
of various kinds of nonaccounting, financial and other 
information in security analysis. They measured the 
relative importance of the information items by the number 
of times an item was mentioned in a protocol. Nine of the 
twelve analysts who provided usable responses did take* r.ote 
of the sample company's pension accounting and disclosures, 
but the impact of the information, if any, on their 
decision processes was not studied.
Literature Review Summary
The research methodology derived from the Brunswik 
lens model was the basis of the research design used in the 
present research. Early lens model studies of financial 
decisions showed that linear models could be developed to 
describe investment decisions, and there was little 
evidence that personality variables affected information 
processing in an investment decisions (Savich, 1977;
McGhee, et al ., 1978). Most of the studies did not use the 
full lens model because the companies used as test cases
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were artificially created by combining cue values in an 
orthogonal design. Only Wright's studies (1977,1979) used 
real companies as test cases, but his results on the 
accuracy of subject stock price predictions were affected 
by the choice of cue sets which had low predictive ability.
Market studies can provide a basis for selecting cues 
which have a significant relationship to the environmental 
event of interest. A number of market studies showed that 
there is a relationship between market equity values and 
unfunded vested pension benefits. The relationship between 
market equity values and the status of a firm's pension 
plan was the focus of the experimental task used in the 
present study. Unfunded vested pension benefits had a 
negative effect on firm market values in all the market 
studies reviewed. This implies that the market treats 
unfunded vested benefits as a corporate liability.
However, the results of several studies suggest that 
r epor ted values of unfunded vested benefits are treated as 
an understatement of a firm's actual liability (Feldstein 
and Seligman, 1981; Daley, 1984).
The relationship of unfunded pension benefits to 
equity value is also complicated by governmental 
limitations on corporate liability for unfunded pension 
benefits. Gersovitz (1980) found that the market treated 
unfunded vested benefits as a corporate liability only the
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extent that the unfunded benefits did not exceed 30 percent 
of a firm's net worth, the maximum liability under ERISA.
Although market studies have shown that the unfunded 
vested pension benefits affect market equity values, there 
is little information on whether the information is 
important to individual decision makers. Analysts have 
rated the information as important in questionnaire studies 
(Buzby, 1974; Chandra, 1974 ), and Frishkoff, et al . (1984 )
found that pension information was used by most analysts 
studied in a protocol analysis. However, none of these 
studies tried to measure the actual effect of pension 
information on financial decisions. The few behavioral 
studies that included pension information as a variable 
were not designed to determine whether individual decision 
makers treat pension assets and obligations as assets and 
liabilities of the pension plan sponsor.
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This chapter discusses the methodology that was used 
to test whether the form in which pension information is 
presented affects individual investment decisions. The 
topics presented in this chapter include the research 
question, experimental task, the variables, the hypotheses, 
expectations of the hypotheses, and the statistical 
analys is.
Research Questions
The primary research question investigated was:
1. Are individual investment decisions affected by 
the form in which pension information is 
presented?
The research was designed to test whether the 
disclosure of pension plan assets and obligations in 
footnotes to the financial statements has the same impact
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on decisions as the recognition of that information on 
balance sheets, and to test whether financial statement 
users consider pension plan assets and obligations the 
equivalent of company assets and obligations. The research 
also tested whether recognition is a useful change in the 
sense of enabling a decision maker to make a more accurate 
prediction of a company's trading price as a basis for 
future trading activity (Abdel-Khalik and Keller, 1979, pp. 
4-5) .
The FASB implied that the use of footnote pension 
information in financial decisions was related to the 
expertise of the decision maker (FASB, 1985, par. 116).
One motivation for the change from footnote disclosure to 
balance sheet recognition was to ensure that less 
sophisticated users would be aware of corporate obligations 
for unfunded pension benefits. Therefore, the research 
also investigated whether a change in reporting format from 
footnote disclosures to balance sheet recognition would 
change the ability of less experienced subjects to more 
accurately predict future stock prices relative to the 
predictive abilities of professional analysts. The second 
question investigated was:
2. Will a change from footnote disclosure of pension 
information to balance sheet recognition improve 
the decisions of naive decision makers relative 
to the decisions of professional analysts?
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Experimental Task 
The discussion of the experimental task is divided 
into three areas: the questionnaire, the sample, and the
data collection procedures.
The Questionnaire
Examples of the questionnaire are included in the 
Appendices A through E. The first page of the 
questionnaire summarized the experimental task and listed 
the assumptions the subjects should use in making their 
decisions. The second page described the selected 
accounting and financial information presented in the 
experimental cases with an explanation of the meaning of 
each item. The third and fourth pages consisted of ten 
cases, each of which contained the selected information 
items about an actual company. There were also two 
questions about the subject's estimate of the most likely 
price of the company's common stock one year hence and the 
desirability of a stock purchase based on the company's 
expected price performance over the one year period. Two 
different orders of presentation for the cases were used so 
that the possible effect of case order, which would affect 
the external validity of the study, could be tested 
(Campbell and Stanley, 1966, p. 6).
Companies used as cases were selected from 
publicly-held industrial companies with fiscal year ends on 
December 31. The year end requirement was imposed to make
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the task more realistic because most financial information 
and some annual reports are normally available by mid-March 
for firms with December 31 fiscal year ends.
To limit the extraneous factors affecting subjects' 
decisions, subjects were not informed which companies were 
represented in each case or the exact time period 
represented by the data (Ebert and Kruse, 1978, p. 112)*
They were told that all companies were industrial companies 
that were traded on the New York Stock Exchange and that 
the period of time under consideration was one in which 
market conditions were relatively stable. The actual time 
period for which the stock price change was measured was 
the one year period from the middle of the second week of 
March, 1983 to the middle of the second week of March,
1984. A mid-week date was used to prevent possible con­
founding of environmental predictability with the "weekend 
effect" (the tendency of stocks to have significant 
negative returns on Monday) (French, 1980).
As a first step in selecting the ten cases, the top 
200 companies of the Fortune 500 for 1982 were reviewed to 
determine the extent to which their pension plans were 
overfunded or underfunded. The pension funding status was 
determined for 172 companies for which annual reports with 
pension disclosures were available. The ratio of the net 
pension plan obligation (or net asset for overfunded plans)
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to total company assets was calculated for each company 
because this ratio was used in the case presentation.
The value of the pension ratio ranged from excess plan 
assets equal to 30% of total company assets (Lockheed) to 
an obligation for unfunded benefits equal to 27% of total 
company assets (International Harvester). A summary of the 
distribution of the pension ratio values is presented in 
Table 1, Only 58 of the companies (34%) had underfunded 
pension plans and 114 (66%) had overfunded plans. case 
selection was restricted to companies with overfunded or 
underfunded pension plans that were at least 5% of total 
company assets so that the experimental manipulation of the 
disclosure format would be large enough to possibly affect 
subject's decisions.
Thirty-two of the 47 companies which met the 5% 
cut-off also met the calendar year end requirement and 
disclosed all the information required as case data.l Of 
those 32 companies, 14 had underfunded pension plans (44%) 
and 18 had overfunded plans (56%). The final ten cases 
were equally divided between companies with overfunded and 
underfunded plans. The companies used as test cases are 
listed in Table 2. The companies were selected to provide 
a range of values on the pension cue from a net underfunded
1-Ten companies did not have calendar year ends and 
five did not disclose research and development costs.
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TABLE 1
NET PENSION PLAN ASSETS AND OBLIGATIONS 
AS A PERCENTAGE OF COMPANY ASSETS 
A DISTRIBUTION
<Underfunded> Overfunded
<27% —  5 %> <•:J — 2%> <1%>--1% 2 % —  4% 5% —  30%
Number 
of Cos. 18 15 67 43 29
**Percentage
of Cos. 10.5 00 • "Hi 38.9 25 16. 9
^Percentages were calculated as the ratio of:
(pension plan assets - (vested + unvested benefits))/ 
total company assets
* *As a percentage of 172 companies
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TABLE 2
COMPANIES USED AS EXPERIMENTAL CASES
Case
1 North American Philips
2 LTV
3 White Consolidated Ind'
4 Hercules
5 Caterpillar Tractor
6 United Technologies
7 Monsanto
8 Owens Illinois
9 TRW
10 E.I. dupont de Nemours
position of 23% of total assets 
position of 12% of total assets, 
balanced between companies with 
decreases because approximately 
had experienced an actual price 
period and half had experienced 
present study differs from some 
stock price prediction task in 
cases were not restricted to a 
were not presented with backgro 
market and industry conditions, 
information was used to restrict 
extraneous factors into the deci 
in order that the task (i.e. acc 
seem achievable to the subjects, 
reasonably stable over the test
to a net overfunded
. The ten cases were eg ua
price increases and pr ic
half of the 32 compani es
incr ease over the test
a de crease in pr ice. Th
pr ev ious studies using a
that companies included a
sing Ie industry and sub je
und information on the
The limited set of
t the intrusion of
sion environment. However, 
urate price prediction) 
only companies that were 
period were selected ac
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cases, and subjects were informed that stock prices were 
highly predictable with the given set of information.
Three test sets of cases that met the selection criteria 
were developed and tested to determine if a linear model 
were appropriate. The linear model performed well in all 
cases {r 2 over .90} so the set of companies which provided 
the best linear fit of the data was selected for the 
research project.2
On the fourth and last page of the questionnaire, 
subjects were asked to provide some background information. 
The data included the subject's education, experience, and 
professional certification. Different sets of demographic 
questions were used for student subjects and professional 
analysts. Copies of the demographic questions are included 
in Appendices D and E.
Sample
The population of interest was investors, a population 
that the FASB considers one of the primary users of 
financial statements (FASB, 1978, par. 34). Because the 
FASB appeared concerned with possible differences between 
the use of pension disclosures by some "sophisticated" 
users versus "most other users" (FASB, 1985, par. 116), two 
groups were sampled, presumably sophisticated investors and
^The linear model is discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 4.
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less sophisticated financial statement users.
Sophisticated users were represented by professional 
financial analysts. The sample frame was the Financial 
Analysts Federation (FAF) 1986 Pi rectory. Members of the 
FAF are required to be actively involved in financial 
analysis (i.e. collecting, evaluating or applying 
financial, economic and statistical data in the investment 
decision making process). Experimental subjects were drawn 
only from regular members of the FAF. Regular members must 
have had at least three years experience in financial 
analysis and have passed an examination in investment 
analysis. The subjects selected for this study also had to 
identify their functional specialty as portfolio management 
or portfolio strategy.3
Obviously, the group "most other users" can encompass 
a wide range of subject knowledge and experience. in this 
research, the less knowledgeable users were represented by 
MBA students enrolled in graduate accounting classes at 
Louisiana State University and the university of New 
Orleans. The students at both universities were completing 
MBA accounting courses that were very similar in content.
Two of the classes used were evening classes, and the use 
of students enrolled in evening classes increased the 
likelihood that the subjects would have some business
^The only other restriction on eligibility was that 
the subject live in the continental United States. This 
restriction was introduced to simplify mailing procedures.
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e x p e r i e n c e . 4 m  setting financial accounting standards, 
the FASB presumes that financial reporting n . . . should
be comprehensible to those who have a reasonable under­
standing of business . . . ." (FASB, 1978, par. 34) even
though individual investors differ widely in the extent of 
their expertise. MBA students were considered appropriate 
representatives of general financial statement users with 
sufficient educational background in financial statements 
and financial markets. They may also be current or 
prospective stock investors.
The size of the sample was determined after a pretest 
of the research instrument. Sixteen accounting graduate 
students participated in the pretesting. Based on the 
result of the pretest, it was determined that a sample size 
of 28 per cell would be needed to detect a significant 
difference in at least one of the main response variables 
(ie. price prediction or purchase recommendation). The 
sample size estimate was based on alpha levels of .05. The 
actual number of subjects was slightly higher than this 
est imate.
There were 5,604 financial analysts who met the 
criteria for inclusion in the sample. In order to assure 
an adequate number of financial analysts as respondents, a
4This assumption was supported by the demographic data 
provided by the students which is discussed in Chapter 4. 
Approximately two-thirds of the student subjects had some 
business experience.
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systematic random sample of 450 analysts (8%) was drawn 
from the Financial Analysts Federation Pi rectory. The 
sample was taken using a random start and drawing every 
twelfth name in the chapter listing in order to select 450 
subjects from a 5,604 name listing. The resulting sample 
approximated the geographic distribution of the FAF 
membership, which is more heavily concentrated in large 
Northeastern cities (Boston, New York, and Philadelphia).
Responses to mail questionnaires are generally a 
small percentage of the original mailing, on average 
between 20% and 40% (Green and Tull, 1978, p. 150). An 
initial 450 subject sample was chosen in order to obtain 30 
respondents per cell if the response rate were just 20%.
Data Collection
The questionnaire was administered to three groups of 
MBA students in a laboratory setting during their weekly 
class meetings. Each student in each class was randomly 
assigned to one of the three experimental treatments 
(discussed in the following section), rather than 
administering only one form of the questionnaire to each 
class, to prevent possible bias if there were some 
systematic differences among classes (Campbell and Stanley, 
1963, p. 15). To encourage the students to take the task 
seriously, an economic incentive was offered. students
were informed that a $25.00 cash award would be paid to the 
student who made the most accurate estimate of the ten
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stock prices. The students were also told that their 
responses would be kept confidential except for the purpose 
of determining the cash recipient. The announcement of the 
cash award appeared to increase the students’ interest in 
the task.
The professional analysts were contacted using a mail 
questionnaire. The primary disadvantage of this approach 
is the problem of low response (Kerlinger, 1973, p. 414).
A low response could reflect different characteristics in 
the populations of respondents and non-respondents {e.g. 
respondents could be unsuccessful analysts with nothing to 
do but answer questionnaires), which would limit the 
external validity of the study. In order to increase the 
response rate, financial analysts were told that a $50.00 
cash award would be paid to the respondent who made the 
most accurate stock price prediction. Analysts were 
assured their responses would be kept confidential and were 
given the option of returning their questionnaire without 
their name and address if they did not wish to be eligible 
for tne award.
In addition to the cash award, standard follow-up 
procedures were used. A postcard was sent three days after 
the original survey mailing, and a second copy of the 
questionnaire was sent two weeks after the original
mailing. Evidence on the effect of adding a copy of the 
questionnaire to a follow-up mailing has been inconclusive,
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but in some surveys it has had a significant effect on 
response rate (Heberlein and Baumgartner, 1978). The 
second request was targeted to subjects who did not respond 
to the first mailing. The assumption was made that 
respondents to the first mailing would provide their name 
in order to be eligible for the cash award or would return 
an enclosed postcard requesting a copy of the research 
resu1ts.
The Variables 
This section will discuss the independent and 
dependent variables used in this study and the 
justification for their inclusion. In lens model studies, 
the independent variables, which are treated as 
within-subjects factors, are referred to as cues. This 
study used a maximum of seven cues per case . Three 
different forms of the cue set and the two subject 
classifications were used as between-subjects factors.
Subject responses to two experimental tasks were used as 
dependent variables in the data analysis. Four additional 
dependent variables based on the Brunswik lens model were 
derived from correlational analysis of subject responses.
Within-Subjects Factors (Cues)
Cue values were obtained from company 10-K reports,
Value Line Security Service, and the Wall Street journal.
The cues selected for inclusion in the study were based on 
the theoretical market valuation models developed by Hiller 
and Modigliani (1958, 1963), Hamada (1969), and Litzen- 
berger and Rao (1971), and the corresponding econometric 
model developed by Feldstein and Seligman (1981) in their 
empirical study of the relationship of equity value to firm 
pension obligations. Litzenberger and Rao characterized 
equity value as a function of after-tax "permanent 
earnings," risk, and growth. These three components are 
the basis of equity valuation models in a number of 
empirical studies as well as financial information 
processing research, although the components have been 
operationalized in different ways (a comparison of cue sets 
used in some accounting and financial studies is presented 
in Table 3).
Permanent earnings are defined as the expected value 
of future accounting earnings. However, permanent earnings 
cannot be used as a cue value because they cannot be 
measured in a market characterized by heterogeneous 
expectations. Beaver (1981, p. 114.) has shown that 
permanent earnings will differ across individuals and over 
time unless market participants have homogeneous 
expectations. Although past accounting earnings are not 
the same as permanent earnings, there is empirical evidence
that accounting earnings have information content at the 
market level (see Beaver, 1981, pp. 117-36 for a review of
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TABLE 3
CUE SETS USED IN PRIOR ACCOUNTING RESEARCH
CUES
f
WRIGHT
TASK:
(1977)
Secur i ty pr ice 
change estimate
Prior yr. closing price 
E.P.S.— current year 
E.P.S.— prior year 
5 yr . avg. price change 
Current yr. dividend 
Debt/equity ratio 
Beta
SAVICH (1977 ) ; Sales
McGHEE, SHIELDS AND Net income
BTRNBERG (1978) Fully diluted E.P.S. 
Primary E.P.S.
TASK : Buy/sell
recommendation
Change in financial 
Extraordinary items 
Provision for income 
Contingenc ies
posit ion 
taxes
WRIGHT (1979) Prior y r . percentage 
earnings
change in
TASK : Secur ity price 
change estimate
5 yr . average change 
earnings 
Dividend payout 
Beta
in
LARCKER AND LESSIG (1984) Average price— current yr.
Change in E.P.S.— current year 
TASK: Buy/No-buy 5 year avg. change in E.P.S.
recommendation Dividend yield
Debt/equity ratio 
Beta
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the literature). Therefore, primary earnings per share 
(EPS), excluding extraordinary items, for 1983 was used as 
an earnings information cue.
The second cue, growth (GROWTH), was operationa1ized 
as the arithmetic average of the percentage change in 
annual earnings, before extraordinary items, over the five 
year period 1978-1982. The ratio of expenditures on 
research and development to firm assets (R &D) was also 
included as a cue to represent the relationship between 
current and future earnings. Feldstein and Seligman (1981) 
used this cue as a variable in their econometric model and 
found it had a significant positive relationship to firm 
equity value.
The risk component of the equity valuation model was 
operationalized using the ratio of long-term debt to total 
assets (DEBT), a traditional measure of corporate leverage. 
Leverage has been shown to have a significant relation to 
the average risk perception of financial analysts 
(Farrelly, et a l ., 1985, p. 284). In prior empirical 
pension studies, higher debt/asset ratios decreased the 
market value of the firm, possibly because of bankruptcy 
risk or limitations on a firm's activities implied by debt 
service obligations (Feldstein and Seligman, 1981, p. 818).
Beta (BETA) was also included as a risk measure. Beta 
is an estimate of the ratio of the covariance of the 
security's rate of return with a market average divided by
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the variance of the rate of return of the market average.
Beta values were obtained from Value Line for the second 
week of March, 1983.
The closing price of the company's common stock on the 
Wednesday of the second week of March, 1983 (LASTPR) was 
provided because past price data on common stocks is 
generally available, and may be used in equity appraisal 
(Foster, 1978, pp. 302-05).
Between-subjects Factors
The basic research design was the 3 X 2  factorial 
presented in Table 4. Subject expertise was a 
classification factor and had two levels, financial analyst 
and MBA student, which were explained in the discussion of 
the research subjects.
The most important between-subjects factor in this 
research was the format of the cue set, which was 
manipulated to capture the effect of changes in the form 
of presentation of pension information (i.e. balance sheet 
recognition versus disclosure). Two groups of subjects 
received the same pension cue, but with different positions 
in the cases. The measurement of the pension cue is 
explained in the following section.
The pension cue. Studies of the effect of pension 
disclosures on equity values have focused exclusively on 
unfunded vested pension liabilities as a measure of a
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TABLE 4 
•r e s e a r c h  DESIGN
CUE SET FORMAT
Footnote Balance
Sheet
Ad j us ted 
Debt/Asset 
Ratio
EXPERTISE
Student s/ft s/bs s/ad jD
Financial Analyst fa/ft f a/bs fa/ad jD
To designate subject groups, student subjects are 
identified with the letter "s" and financial analysts with 
the letters "fa".
The cue sets are identified as "ft" for footnote cue, 
nbs" for balance sheet cue, and "adjD" for adjusted 
debt/asset ratio.
company's legal liability. However, the FASB defined the 
obligation of a plan sponsor as the total of both vested 
and unvested benefits in its standards for recognition of 
net pension liabilities (FASB, p^r. 18, 1985). Therefore,
the sum of vested and unvested benefits was used to 
determine the pension obligation.5 The market value of
5There is no empirical evidence as to whether unvested 
benefits are treated as a liability of the firm by the 
market in setting firm value. As of the balance sheet 
date, an employer has neither a legal nor moral obligation 
to pay unvested pension benefits. However, unvested 
benefits may be an appropriate element of a firm's
63
pension plan assets was offset against the total obligation 
for pension benefits so that the pension cue was consistent 
with SPAS 87 (FASB, 1985, par. 36).
The pension cue was calculated as follows:
PENSION - [PAi - (VP i + UVPi))/Ai (1)
PAi ■ market value of plan assets of compa
VPi - vested pension benefits of company i
UVPi * unvested pension benefits of company
Ai ■ end of period book value of firm i
assets
The cue coefficients were positive for overfunded 
plans and negative for underfunded plans. The value of the 
pension cue was deflated by firm assets to make the pension 
cue comparable to the debt/asset cue.
One group of subjects was given the pension cue as a 
footnote disclosure. The cue was not mentioned in the 
introductory material, but an explanation was included with 
the cue at the bottom of the set of cases. The second 
group received the pension cue in the body of the cue set 
following the debt/asset ratio, which was assumed to be 
equivalent to the position an unfunded pension obligation 
would occupy on the balance sheet.
obligation in determining the firm's access to plan assets 
in the event of a plan termination. Plan participants 
become fully vested in their accrued benefits (100 percent 
vesting) under ERISA to the extent that plan assets are 
available to provide benefits when the plan is terminated.
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The third group of subjects did not receive a separate 
pension cue. Instead they were given a debt/asset cue 
adjusted for the net effect of the pension plan assets and 
obligations. The adjustment was explained in the cue set 
description presented to the subjects. The purpose of 
using the adjusted debt/asset ratio was to obtain a measure 
of decision making when pension plan assets and obligations 
are treated as the equivalent of company assets and 
liabilities. The third group of subjects did not have the 
option of weighing pension information as anything but a 
debt or asset of the company. This provided a baseline 
against which to compare responses of the groups who 
received the pension cue and who could choose whether or 
not to treat the company's pension plan position as a 
component of its debt/asset position.
Combining pension plan disclosures with balance sheet 
assets and liabilities in the adjusted debt/asset cue 
created a measurement problem because pension plan assets 
are recorded at fair market value, not historical cost 
(SFAS No. 35, par. 9-14, SFAS No. 36, par. 2). However, 
the effect was consistent with current standards. Under 
SFAS No. 87, the net pension liability is calculated using 
the fair market value of plan assets (FASB, 1985, par. 36).
The treatment of the pension cue was not totally
consistent with SFAS 87. The FASB only requires 
recognition of a net pension liability on the balance sheet
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of companies with underfunded plans. There is no 
recognition requirement if a pension plan is overfunded. 
Although the FASB stated its belief that pension plan 
assets were assets of the firm, the final statement did not 
require recognition of a net asset position because the 
FASB felt the change would be too great a departure from 
past practices (FASB, par. 107, 1985). This research
included cases in which the effect of overfunding was 
recognized because the effect of overfunding on decision 
making is highly relevant, given the large number of 
companies with overfunded plans.
Dependent Variables
The subjects were asked to make two decisions for each 
of the ten cases. The first experimental task required 
subjects to make ex post estimates of the most likely 
prices of the common stocks of the ten case companies at 
the end of a one year period from the middle of the second 
week of March, Year 1 to the middle of the second week of 
March, Year 2 based on the cues presented. Stock price 
prediction is a fairly common experimental task in lens 
model research because it represents a realistic financial 
evaluation decision (Foster, 1978, pp. 301-11). The use of 
a price prediction task also allowed subject responses to 
be evaluated using the full lens model (see Chapter 2 for a 
discussion).
In order that results be comparable to previous 
empirical research, the stock price estimates were con­
verted to estimates of equity market value by multiplying 
subjects' stock price estimates by the number of shares of 
stock outstanding. Equity value was deflated hy firm size 
in order to remove possible effects of heteroscedasticity 
(non-constant error-term variance) in the cross-sectional 
regression equation used in developing the lens model.
Heteroscedasticity may be related to firm size, so firm 
size was used as a scaler in empirical pension studies 
(Oldfield, 1976; Feldstein and Seligman, 1981; Daley,
1983 ) .
In addition to predicting stock prices, subjects we re 
asked to make purchase recommendations for the ten 
companies based on the expected stock price performance 
over the one year period. The recommendations were for 
inclusion in a hypothetical customer's portfolio in order 
that the decisions not reflect the subject's personal 
portfolio preferences. All subjects were informed that the 
client was a middle-aged business person who already held a 
well-diversified portfolio. The recommendations were made 
on an eleven point scale (0, definitely not recommend; 5 
neutral; 10, definitely recommend).
The second task was included to increase the external
validity of the results. cues may have a different impact 
when a subject is asked to recommend a course of action
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rather than simply to make a prediction, and empirical work 
in decision-making has shown that the judgment process can 
be sensitive to even a seemingly minor change in task 
(Brehmer, 1976, p. 8; Einhorn and Hogarth, 1981, p.8).
The use of two separate response variables allowed 
subject attention to the experimental task to be determined 
by examining the internal consistency of subject responses. 
Internal consistency was measured as the correlation 
between predicted stock price changes (calculated from 
subject stock price predictions) and the strength of the 
purchase recommendation. If subjects paid attention to the 
task requirements, which asked that the recommendation be 
based on expected price performance, a prediction of price 
appreciation should be accompanied by a positive purchase 
recommendation. Responses of subjects which were not 
positively correlated were discarded as unusable. 6
The stock price variable was also used in the lens 
model equation to derive three additional dependent 
variables which measure the subject's ability to correctly 
predict stock prices. A fourth measure of prediction 
achievement, mean square error, is also discussed in the 
following section.
Lens Model variables. The accuracy of the subjects' 
stock price predictions (Ys) was measured for each subject
®When the data was analyzed, the responses of only one 
student subject were discarded based on this criterion.
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as the multiple correlation of Ys and the actual stock 
prices, Ye. Multiple regression analysis with standardized 
variables was also used to create linear models for each 
subject and to obtain optimal predictions of ys based on 
each subject's linear model:
A
Ys « bsiXi + bs2x2 + . . . bSiXn (2)
Where:
A
Ys * optimal linear prediction of Ys
Ys ■ subject's actual stock price prediction
bs^ " regression weight
xn - cue n in standardized form
A
The optimal prediction of Ys, Ys, was used in the lens
A
model equation with the optimal prediction of Ye, Ye, to 
provide alternative measures of achievement based on the 
following modified lens model equation (Hammond and 
Summers, 1972, p. 59; Hammond, 1980, p.9):7
Ra * G * Re * Rs (3)
Where :
Ra * multiple cor relat ion between Ye and Ys
A
G = mult iple correlation between Ye and YS
A
Re - multiple correlation between Ye and Ye
A
Rs - multiple correlation between YS and YS
?The modified equation is based on the assumption that 
subjects process information in a linear manner. This is 
typically the case and held true in this research based on 
an evaluation of the nonlinear components of subjects' 
decisions (Slovic, et al., 1972, p. 296; Libby, 1981, p.
21; Kessler and Ashton, 1981, p. 153; Ashton, 1982, p. 31).
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in the lens model, achievement is measured in correla­
tional terms. R a , the overall measure of achievement, is 
measured as the multiple correlation between the actual 
stock prices and the subject's predicted stock prices. Ra 
is limited by environmental predictability, Re, which is 
measured as the multiple correlation coefficient between 
the actual stock price and the stock price predicted by the 
environmental regression model. The groups with the 
adjusted debt/asset ratio did not have the same 
environmental constraint as the two groups with the pension 
cue so Ra was only used to compare groups with pension 
cues,
The individual components of R a , G and Rs, provide an
explanation of achievement. using Ra as a measure of
achievement ignores the fact that the criterion event may
not be perfectly predictable from the cue set. The
matching index, commonly denoted G, is sometimes used as an
alternative (Tucker, 1964, p. 528). The matching index
takes into account the statistical limitations set by a
given environmental or subject response system. without
such knowledge:
" . . .  it is impossible (a) to evaluate a subject's 
achievement within that system, {b) to compare a 
subject's achievement across ecological situations 
which have different statistical characteristics, and 
(c) to understand why the subject's achievement was as 
high or low as it was." (Hursch, Hammond, and Hursch, 
1964, p. 43).
Rs is interpreted as a measure of the consistency with 
which a subject applies his judgment policy and is 
sometimes referred to as a measure of cognitive control 
(Hammond and Summers, 1972). Rs is important in under­
standing achievement because overall lack of accuracy is 
most often attributed to an individual's failure to apply a 
judgment rule consistently (Brehmer, 1976). Even if a 
subject has perfect knowledge of environmental relation­
ships (G * 1.00)/ Ra will be less than Re unless the 
subject applies his knowledge of the environment in a 
perfectly consistent fashion (Rs *1.00).
G and Rs can be analyzed even if subjects display no 
significant differences in overall achievement. Equal 
levels of achievement could be due to completely different 
factors. For example, one subject might achieve a level of 
accuracy due to perfect knowledge of the environment (G * 
1.00) and imperfect control over his decision strategy (Rs 
< 1.00). Another subject could achieve the same level of 
accuracy with imperfect knowledge (G < 1.00) but perfect 
control (r s * 1.00) (Hammond and summers, 1972, p. 60).
In addition to correlational measures, Wright (1982, 
p. 68) suggests that when exact values of prediction errors 
are important, as when a security analyst is predicting 
returns, a scale dependent measure like the mean square
error (MSE) is more meaningful as a measure of performance 
than a correlational measure. Correlation is an appropriate
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scoring rule if the relative ranking of predictions and 
outcomes are the relevant criterion. However, MSE 
incorporates a measure of the spread of the estimates 
around the true values (Johnston, 1904, p. 28). MSE can 
also be used to compare groups operating under different 
environmental constraints. Therefore, achievement was also 
measured using MSE. MSE was calculated as:
MSE - [£(Yei - Ys i )2] / n (4)
I
Where:
Ye^ = actual company i equity value
Ysi * a subject's prediction of equity value for 
company i (derived from the subject's 
stock price prediction)
n « number of cases (10)
Hypotheses
The first eight hypotheses test the effect of the main 
between-subject factor, cue set format, on the subjects’ 
price predictions and purchase recommendations. Hypothesis 
1 and Hypothesis 2 test for an overall effect of cue set 
format on the response variables and the remaining six 
hypotheses (la through lb and 2a through 2c) test a priori 
contrasts among specified groups.
HI: There are no significant differences in stock
price predictions among subjects who receive 
different forms of the cue set (s/ft and fa/ft 
vs. s/bs and fa/bs vs s/adjD and fa/adjD>.
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Hla: There are no significant differences in stock
price predictions between subjects who receive 
a footnote pension cue and those who receive 
the pension cue in a balance sheet position 
(s/ft and fa/ft vs. s/bs and Ja/bs).
Hlb: There are no significant differences in stock
price predictions between subjects who receive 
a footnote pension cue and those who receive an 
adjusted debt/asset cue (s/ft and fa/ft vs. 
s/adjD and fa/adjD).
Hlc: There are no significant differences in stock
price predictions between subjects who receive 
the pension cue in a balance sheet position and 
those who receive an adjusted debt/asset cue 
(s/bs and fa/bs vs. s/adjD and fa/adjD).
H2: There are no significant differences in purchase
recommendations among subjects who receive 
different forms of the cue set (s/ft and fa/ft 
vs. s/bs and fa/bs vs. s/adjD and fa/adjD).
H2a: There are no significant differences in
purchase recommendations between subjects who 
receive a footnote pension cue and those who 
receive the pension cue in a balance sheet 
position (s/ft and fa/ft vs. s/bs and fa/bs).
H2b: There are no significant differences in
purchase recommendations between subjects who 
receive a footnote pension cue and those who 
receive an adjusted debt/asset ratio (s/ft and 
fa/ft vs. s/adjD and fa/adjD).
H2c: There are no significant differences in
purchase recommendations between subjects who 
receive the pension cue in a balance sheet 
position and those who receive an adjusted 
debt/asset cue (s/bs and fa/bs vs. s/adjD and 
fa/adjD).
The next three hypotheses test for the overall effect 
of both the format of the cue set and the level of subject 
expertise on prediction achievement, using MSE and the lens 
model achievement measures. Since the six groups do not 
receive identical cue sets, they do not have the same envi-
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ronmental constraints on prediction achievement.
Therefore, Ra will not be used for overall comparisons 
among the six groups.
H3a: There are no significant differences among
subjects who receive different cue set 
formats and who have different levels of 
expertise in the mean square error (MSE) of 
their stock price predictions.
H3b: There are no significant differences among
subjects who receive different cue set formats 
and who have different levels of expertise in 
their ability to match their decision models to 
the appropriate environmental model (G>.
H3c: There are no significant differences among
subjects who receive different cue set formats 
and who have different levels of expertise in 
the consistency with which they follow their 
decision models (Rs).
The following hypotheses are a priori comparisons, and 
the dependent variables used in the tests depend on which 
of the three preceding hypotheses tests are significant. 
Hypotheses 4a, 4b and 4c compare the prediction achievement 
of groups with different cue set formats.
H4a: There are no significant differences in the
accuracy of stock price predictions between 
subjects who receive a footnote pension cue and
subjects who receive the pension cue in a
balance sheet position (s/ft and fa/ft vs. s/bs 
and fa/bs) .
H4b: There are no significant differences in the
accuracy of stock price predictions between 
subjects who receive a footnote pension cue and
subjects who receive an adjusted debt/asset cue
(s/ft and fa/ft vs. s/adjD and fa/adjD).
H4c: There are no significant differences in the
accuracy of stock price predictions between 
subjects who receive the pension cue in a 
balance sheet position and subjects who receive
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an adjusted debt/asset cue (s/bs and fa/bs vs. 
s/adjD and fa/adjD) .
The last three hypotheses address the secondary issue 
of whether professional analysts are better able to 
incorporate pension disclosures into their decisions than 
other users.
H5a: There are no significant differences in the
accuracy of stock price predictions between 
professional analysts who receive a footnote 
pension cue and student subjects who receive the 
same cue set (s/ft vs. fa/ft).
H5b: There are no significant differences in che
accuracy of stock price predictions between 
professional analysts who receive the pension 
cue in a balance sheet position and student 
subjects who receive the same cue set (s/bs vs. 
fa/bs).
H5c: There are no significant differences in the
accuracy of stock price predictions between 
professional analysts who receive an adjusted 
debt/asset ratio and student subjects who 
receive the same cue set (s/adjD vs, fa/adjD).
Expectations of the Hypotheses 
The first four hypotheses deal with the effect of the 
cue set format on stock price predictions. Failure to 
reject Hi will occur if subjects who receive the pension 
cue, whether as a footnote or as a balance sheet 
equivalent, treat the pension assets and obligations as 
company assets and liabilities. However, failure to reject 
HI could also occur if subjects in all six groups ignore 
the leverage cue when predicting stock prices.
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If Hi is rejected, the subjects who received the 
pension cue apparently did not treat it as a simple 
adjustment to the debt/asset ratio in their stock price 
predictions. Subjects could believe unfunded pension 
obligations are not really corporate liabilities or that 
the future effects of plan sponsorship are too uncertain to 
be incorporated into their judgments.
Hypotheses ia through lc can provide insight into the 
source of group differences. if Hla is not rejected/ the 
pension information was used or ignored in the same way by 
the four groups that received it, and the distinction 
between a footnote presentation and balance sheet 
equivalent presentation made in this study did not affect 
decisions. If Hla is rejected, the form in which the 
pension information is presented did make a difference to 
the subjects. This result would be consistent with the 
FASB's expectations regarding the effect of SFAS 87.
Rejection of Hla suggests that a change in reporting format 
can signal a different message to users. However, the test 
of Hla is not a test of whether the pension information is 
treated as part of the company's debt/asset position.
Hypotheses lb and lc compare the responses of the 
subjects who received pension cues with those who received 
the adjusted debt/asset ratio to determine whether the 
pension information had the same impact on decisions as 
corporate leverage. The reasoning for failure to reject
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both Hlb and Hlc is the same as that for failure to reject 
HI. Either the pension cues were treated as a component of 
corporate leverage or all six groups ignored the debt/asset 
cue when making stock price predictions.
Rejection of Hla should be accompanied by rejection of 
Hlb, Hlc, or both. If the footnote cue format and the 
balance sheet format do not have the same effect on 
decisions in the test of Hla, at least one cue is expected 
not to be treated by the subjects as a simple adjustment to 
the debt/asset ratio. However, rejection of Hlb or Hlc 
could occur even if Hla is not rejected. Even if the 
subjects who receive the two forms of the pension cue do 
not distinguish between the footnote and balance sheet 
presentation, they may not treat the pension cue as a 
component of corporate debt. These results would suggest 
that recognition requirements do not necessarily cause 
financial statement users to consider pension obligations 
the equivalent of long-term debt.
Hypotheses 2 and 2a through 2c are similar to Hi and 
Hla through Hlc, but are tested using the purchase 
recommendation as the response variable. Results should be 
consistent with the tests of the first four hypotheses if 
the cues carry similar weights across the two decisions. 
However, results of tests on the stock price predictions 
and purchase recommendations may not be consistent if the 
cues affect the two decisions differently. For example,
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information on the risk of the stock might be weighed more
heavily in the purchase recommendation decision than in the
stock price prediction. Any differences in outcomes would
indicate that information use is sensitive to the task 
definition.
The tests of Hypotheses 3a through 3c examine the 
effect of both cue set format changes and the subject level 
of expertise on subjects' predictive abilities. Subject 
expertise should affect MSE (H3a). The professional 
analysts are expected to show a smaller MSE because of 
their greater experience with the task. The effect of the 
cue set format on the MSE of prediction is not clear 
priori. The subjects who received the debt/asset cue 
received slightly more aggregated data than the subjects 
with the pension cue. Although information theory and 
Entropy Law state that aggregation results in the loss of 
information, the theory is concerned with the physical 
properties of information, not whether information users 
are equally able to assimilate pieces of data and 
aggregated data (Lev, 1969, pp. 7-12; Abde1-Khalik, 1974).
In this study, the adjusted debt/asset ratio should be 
easier for subjects to incorporate into their decisions 
than either of the pension cues.
In the test of H3b, matching (G) should be greater for 
professional analysts than for the student subjects because 
the analysts should have greater insight into environmental
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relationships. The effect of the cue set format on G 
depends on the subject’s ability to utilize the pension 
cue. The cue set manipulation represents a very small data 
expansion, but even a small expansion can increase the 
perceived complexity of the environment. Such changes can 
decrease accuracy by causing subjects to revert to a 
simpler decision strategy (reliance on fewer pieces of 
information) to cope with the more complex environment 
(American Accounting Association, 1977, p. 38). Subjects 
with the pension cue could also display a lower level of 
matching if pension information is less interpretable than 
a simple leverage cue.
Prior behavioral research does not provide a basis for 
hypothesizing that professional analysts will be more or 
less consistent than student subjects in the test of H3c. 
Increased experience may increase consistency, but 
experience can also teach when to deviate from consistency 
to handle an unusual event. Research results on the effect 
of experience on an individual's insight into his judgment 
process, which might affect the consistency with which a 
judgment rule is applied, have been mixed. Although 
Slovic, et a l . (1972 ) found student subjects had greater 
self-insight than professional analysts, their results have 
not held in other studies comparing student subjects to 
professionals in different decision environments (Ashton 
and Kramer, 1980; Ashton and Brown, 1980).
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Cue set format will affect consistency if the increase 
in the number of cues pushes subjects past the point at 
which they are dealing with an optimal information load in 
terms of their information processing abilities (Driver 
and Mock, 1975, p. 496). However, failure to find any 
effect of cue set format on consistency could occur if the 
addition of the pension cue does not create a significantly 
more complex information load.
Expectations regarding the final hypotheses will be 
discussed in general terms because the actual dependent 
variables are unknown prior to the outcomes of H3a, H3b, 
and H3c. Hypothesis 4a compares subjects who received the 
same information set, but with the pension cue placed in 
either a footnote format or presented in the equivalent of 
a balance sheet position. If the FASB is correct in their 
view that present pension footnote disclosures are not 
integrated into decisions, H4a will be rejected. subjects 
who receive the pension cue in footnote form are more 
likely to ignore the information than subjects who receive 
the same information in a balance sheet position. Failure 
to reject H4a would imply that subjects weighed the pension 
cue in a similar way. However, the results would not 
indicate whether subjects were equally able to understand 
the pension information in both formats or whether the 
information was ignored in both forms of presentation.
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Hypotheses 4b and 4c compare subjects who received the 
pension cue with those who received the adjusted debt/asset 
cue. Hypothesis 4b compares subjects who received the 
footnote pension cue with subjects who received the 
adjusted debt/asset cue. The reason for rejection of H4b 
is the same as the reason for rejection of H4a . if 
subjects do not use footnote pension information in their 
decisions in the same way that they use information on 
corporate leverage, H4b will be rejected. The hypothesis 
will not be rejected if subjects adjust the leverage cue 
for the effect of the footnote pension cue information.
Placement of pension information on the balance sheet 
does not force users to treat the information as a 
component of the company's financial position. H4c will be 
rejected if subjects who receive the pension cue in a 
balance sheet position fail to use it as an adjustment to 
the company's debt/asset position. Further interpretation 
of h 4b and H4c depends on the dependent variables used to 
test the hypotheses. If significant differences occur 
between groups on G, the introduction of the separate 
pension cue affects subjects' ability to capture the 
environmental relationship in their decision model. A 
priori, G is expected to be smaller for groups with the 
pension cue. Subjects should be less likely to determine 
the relationship of the pension cue to market equity values 
than a simple leverage ratio to market equity values.
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Significant differences between groups on Rs indicates 
introduction of the pension cue has affected the 
consistency with which subjects apply their decision 
strategy. This could occur if introduction of the pension 
cue is sufficient to introduce a state of information 
over load.
The preceding hypotheses test the effect of 
alternative forms of pension reporting. The FASB has 
raised the issue that sophisticated analysts may be able to 
incorporate pension disclosures into their decisions better 
than most other users. The question will be addressed by 
testing the final three hypotheses.
Ra was included as a dependent variable in the tests 
of H5a, H5b and H5c because the hypotheses compare groups 
with identical cue sets. The use of MSE in addition to Ra 
also provides a check of the sensitivity of the achievement 
results to the use of a correlational performance measure 
(Kessler and Ashton, 1981, p. 153).
Hypotheses 5a, 5b and 5c should be rejected. Pro­
fessional analysts should be better able to predict stock 
prices than student subjects because of their experience 
and greater understanding of environmental relationships. 
Rejection of these hypotheses would support the position 
that professional analysts (sophisticated users) have an 
advantage over most other users that does not appear 
affected by simple changes in the format of the pension
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disclosures. These results would imply that the FASB's 
concern with eliminating the comparative advantage of 
professional analysts through changes in the format of 
financial reporting may be misplaced.
If none of these hypotheses is rejected, the 
experiment will have failed to detect any significant 
difference in achievement between sophisticated and 
unsophisticated users, regardless of the cue set format.
This could be due to a lack of underlying differences in 
the abilities of sophisticated and unsophisticated users to 
predict stock prices with the given information set, but it 
could also be due to subject failure to pay serious 
attention to the task.
There is also the possibility that the outcome of the 
three hypotheses tests will not be consistent (rejection of 
some but not all three hypotheses). If H5a and H5b are 
rejected and H5c is not rejected, inclusion of the pension 
cue changed the relative performance of the professional 
analysts and student subjects. Examination of group means 
on the dependent variables will indicate whether inclusion 
of the pension cue brought an improvement or deterioration 
in the performance of the professional analysts or the 
student subjects. Professional analysts should be better 
able to integrate the pension information into their 
decision models and to attain consistent levels of perform­
ance despite the format of the information set. There is
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also the possibility that professional analysts will ignore 
the pension information while the student subjects attempt 
to integrate the information into their decisions, changing 
their performance relative to the professional analysts. 
Hogarth provides a theoretical framework for this outcome 
(Hogarth, 1981, pp. 171-72). Hogarth suggests that to the 
extent a person has a well-developed set of beliefs about 
the task environment, he will be more sensitive to 
information needs relative to the task and less subject to 
availability bias. When the task is relatively unfamiliar, 
subjects may be more biased to use the available task vari­
ables whether or not they understand the relationship 
between the variables and the task.
If H5c is rejected, but H5a and H5b are not, 
introduction of the pension cue has apparently equalized 
the performance of the two groups in some way. Groups can 
be compared for differences in group means on the dependent 
variables for an indication of the source of the change in 
pe r f ormance.
Statistical Analysis
The design used to test HI, Hla through Hlc, H2, and 
H2a through H2c is a repeated measures design with two 
between-subjects factors (cue set format and sophistication 
level) and a with in-subject factor, consisting of the ten 
different cases to which the subjects provide responses.
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Profile analysis will be used to analyze the repeated 
measures data. Profile analysis is simply a framework in 
which to apply traditional analysis of variance on repeated 
measures data when scores on each trial, or case, are 
measured on the same scale and in the same units (e.g. 
dollars). Profile analysis involves comparisons among the 
mean curves or profiles of each group on the response 
variables and it follows the traditional ANOVA sequence of 
testing first for a significant interaction between trials 
and the between-subject factors and then testing for main 
effects (Bock, 1975, p. 470). Profile analysis is 
described in more detail in the following section.
Profile Analysis
In a repeated measures design, approached as a profile 
analysis, the first statistical test is for a Group x Trial
interaction. This is generally referred to as the
hypothesis of parallelism because the test is of the 
hypothesis that the slopes of the population profile 
segments are the same under each condition (Morrison, 1976, 
p. 155). In this research, HI and H2 are tests on the 
average response of each subject across all ten cases for
significant main effects of the pension format factor on
subject stock price predictions and purchase 
recommendations respectively. If there is no interaction, 
the data can be analyzed using a univariate F-test to
85
determine the significance of the between-subject factors, 
if an interaction effect is present, the equality of the 
treatment effects must be analyzed separately for each case 
using univariate ANOVAs (Morrison, 1976, p. 208).
Testing for significant interaction can be done using 
a mixed-model analysis of variance with the between-subject 
factors (i.e. cue set format and subject expertise) and 
case treated as completely crossed fixed factors. Subjects 
are treated as a completely random factor nested within the 
between-subject factors (Bock, 1975, p. 449). However, use 
of this method of analysis requires that the data satisfy 
certain validity conditions (Huynh and Mandeville, 1979).
If the validity conditions are not met, the distribution of 
the F-ratio used in testing the hypothesis of parallelism 
will be distorted and the hypothesis of equal parallel 
profiles will be rejected too frequently. The F-test 
becomes overly stringent.
There are alternatives to testing for parallelism when 
the trials do not satisfy the validity conditions. The 
univariate test can be modified by adjusting the degrees of 
freedom for the test statistic by one of three correction 
factors. Geisser and Greenhouse (1959) developed a 
correction factor, e, based on elements in the population 
variance-covariance matrix which they conservatively 
estimated by using the lower bound for e, l/(p-l) where p 
is the number of cases. The population variance-covariance
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matrix is almost never known, but Collier, et al. <1967)
and Huynh and Feldt (1976) provided approximate tests using 
a value of e determined from the sample variance- 
covariance matrix.
A multivariate analysis has also been suggested as a 
method of analysis when the mixed-model assumptions cannot 
be met (Bock, 1975, p. 470). In this research, the outcome 
of both the univariate and multivariate tests for 
interaction are examined because there is no consistent 
ordering of the sensitivity of the various univariate tests 
and the multivariate test (Romaniuk, et a l . 1977, p. 1760).
Statistical Tests
The first test in this research is for an interaction 
between the main effect of cue-set format and the case 
treatments. The test for significant interaction will be 
done using a univariate F-test. Interaction is tested by 
first calculating difference scores between adjacent 
variables and then using these difference scores as 
dependent variables. The ten cases yield nine difference 
scores for price predictions and nine difference scores for 
the purchase recommendations. The results of the test for 
interaction will show whether the effect of cue set format, 
if any, is constant across all cases. For example, the 
effect of cue set format might depend on the size of the
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pension ratio or on whether a plan were overfunded or 
underfunded.
If there is no significant interaction, the tests of 
Hi and H2 can be carried out as simple tests for the main 
effect of the cue set factor using an ANOVA approach 
(overall-F for the separation of the experimental groups on 
the repeated measures which have been summed and averaged 
(Barker and Barker, 1984, p. 100)). If there is a 
significant interaction between the cases and the cue set 
format, each case will be evaluated separately as a 
dependent variable using a univariate approach. Hypotheses 
la through lc and 2a through 2c will be tested as a priori 
contrasts within the same design.
Hypotheses 3a, 3b and 3c will be analyzed separately 
using a two-factor (cue set format and level of expertise) 
ANOVA model . Hypotheses 4a through 4c and 5a through 5c 
are tested as a priori contrasts within an ANOVA design.
The hypotheses will be tested using the variables 
identified as significant in the test of H3a, H3b, and H3c.
CHAPTER 4
DATA ANALYSIS
This chapter presents the data and the statistical 
tests used to determine the effect of pension reporting 
format on investment decisions and the effect of expertise 
on a decision maker's use of pension information. The 
major topics covered in this chapter are the following: 
the response rate to the mailed questionnaire, the 
statistical analysis and hypotheses tests, and the subject 
demographic data.
The Response Rate 
A total of 450 questionnaires were mailed to the 
selected sample of financial analysts described in 
Chapter 3. Of these 450 questionnaires, 116 were returned 
for a response rate of 25.7%. Of those 116 responses 97, 
or 21.5% of the total and 83.6% of the respondents, were 
usable. The 19 unusable responses were from analysts who
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TABLE 5
RESEARCH DESIGN - SAMPLE SIZE
CUE SET FORMAT
Footnote Balance
Sheet
Adj usted 
Debt/Asset 
Rat io
EXPERTISE
Student s/ft s/bs s/adjD
No. of Subjects 30 30 32
Financial Analyst fa/ft f a/bs fa/adjD
No. of Subjects 31 34 32
purchase recommendations. The total sample of analysts and 
students was 189 subjects. The distribution of subjects 
among the experimental groups is presented in Table 5.
Statistical Analysis 
An overview of the hypotheses tests is presented in 
Table 6. The first set of hypotheses presented in Table 6 
test the overall effect of the cue set format on subjects' 
price predictions {Hi) and purchase decisions (H2). 
Hypotheses la through lc and 2a through 2c are comparisons
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TABLE 6
OVERVIEW OF HYPOTHESES TESTS
I. The effects of cue set format on price predictions and 
purchase decisions
HI: Price predictions: Footnote Cue (ft) vs. Balance
Sheet Cue (bs) vs. Adjusted Debt/Asset Cue (adj/d)
If HI is rejected, perform the following 
comparisons to isolate differences:
Hla: ft vs. bs
Hlb: ft v s . adj/d
Hlc: bs vs. adj/d
H2: Purchase recommendations: ft vs. bs vs. adj/d
If H2 is rejected, perform the following 
comparisons to isolate differences:
H2a: ft vs. bs
H2b: ft vs. adj/d
H2c: bs vs. adj/d
II. The effects of cue set format and expertise on:
H3a: Mean square error of price predictions 
H3b: The ability of a subject to match his decision 
model to an environmental model 
H3c: The consistency with which a subject follows his
decision model.
III. The effect of cue set format on the accuracy of stock 
price predictions:
H4a: ft vs. bs
H4b: ft vs, adj/d
H4c: bs vs. adj/d
IV. The effect of respondent expertise on the accuracy of 
stock price predictions:
H5a: ft
H5b: bs
H 5c: adj/d
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to isolate group differences. Hypotheses la through lc 
will be tested only if HI is rejected, and H2a through H2c 
will be tested only if H2 rejected. The second set of 
hypotheses, H3a through H3c, are overall tests of the 
effect of cue set format and subject expertise on the 
accuracy of subjects' stock price predictions. The last 
two sets of hypotheses are paired comparisons which will be 
tested if H3a, H3b, or H3c can be rejected. Hypotheses 4a 
through 4c investigate the effect of cue set format on the 
accuracy of stock price predictions and H5a through H5c 
investigate the effect of subject expertise on the accuracy 
of stock price predictions.
The statistical analysis is divided into two sections. 
The first section discusses the results of the profile 
analyses for the stock price predictions and purchase 
recommendations. The two profile analyses were used to 
test HI, H2 and the a pr ior i comparisons in Hla through Hlc
and H2a through H2c. The second section discusses the
linear model and the hypotheses tests based on the Biunswik
lens model (Hypotheses 3a through 3c, 4a through 4c, and 5a
through 5c).
Tests of the Effect of Cue Set Format on Stock Price
Predictions (Hi, Hla, Hlb, and Hlc)
Hypothesis 1 : The first hypothesis tested was:
Hi: There are no significant differences in stock
price predictions among subjects who receive
different forms of the cue set (s/ft and fa/ft 
vs. s/bs and fa/bs vs. s/adjD and fa/adjD).
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The purpose of this test was to determine whether the 
subjects who received separate pension cues made the same 
stock price predictions as subjects who received a 
debt/asset ratio adjusted to reflect a firm's pension plan 
status. Rejection of HI would suggest that different forms 
of the cue set did not have the same effect on decisions. 
Group means for all ten price decisions are presented in 
Appendix F.
The first statistical test was to determine whether 
there was significant interaction between the ten cases and 
the experimental groups.1 The presence of significant 
interaction would show that the effect of the cue set 
format, if any, was not constant across all ten cases.
Both the univariate and multivariate tests provided 
evidence of significant interact ion . 2
^Profile analysis is based on the assumption of 
multivariate normality. To test the normality assumption, 
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was used (Conover, 1980, p. 
346). Normality was tested for each of the ten price 
estimates in each of the six experimental groups. The null 
hypothesis of normality was rejected for 16 of the 60 cells 
at an alpha level of .05. Although the normality 
assumption could not be met for all cases, univariate ANOVA 
could still be used to test for interaction. Rogan, 
Keselman, and Mendoza (1979) have shown the e-adjusted 
univariate F-tests can control Type 1 error even when the 
parent population is non-normal.
^The uncorrected F-value for the interaction of trials 
and groups was 2,482.42 (18, 1593 d.o.f., p * .000). The
conservative estimate of e in this test was (1/9), which 
gave an adjusted degrees of freedom of (2,177). The 
critical F-value at .05 alpha for (2,150 d.o.f.) is 3.06. 
Therefore, the hypothesis of no interaction between the 
trials and the between-subject factors was rejected based 
on the conservative test. in the multivariate test,
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Because there was a significant interaction, the effect 
of the cue set factor on stock price predictions was tested 
separately for each case. The results of the univariate 
tests for the significance of the pension factor on 
decisions is summarized in Table 7. Descriptive 
information on the mean responses of the subjects on all 
ten cases is also presented in Table 7.3 Cases 2, 3, 4, 5,
7 and 8 were significant at alpha » .05. For those six 
cases, HI could be rejected. The cue set factor was 
significant for all the cases with underfunded plans, but 
Case 4 was the only overfunded case for which results were 
significant. Case 4 also had the highest positive 
pension/asset ratio (.12) of the overfunded cases.
Therefore, the effect of the cue set format" was apparently 
more pronounced for underfunded plans than for overfunded 
plans, even when the degree of underfunding was relatively 
small (e.g. 5% of total assets). Group differences were 
analyzed using tests of Hypotheses la, lb, and lc for the 
six cases for which the overall-F tests were significant.
The Bonferroni-t statistic was used to assess 
significance for each set of comparisons. The Bonferroni-t
Pillai's criterion was .46 (p - .000) and Wilk's lambda was 
.57 (p » .000), so both test statistics support the 
conclusion that there is a significant interaction between 
the cases and the between-subject factors.
3p-values reported were obtained after pooling 
insignificant interaction terms.
TABLE 7
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CUE SET FACTOR 
ON STOCK PRICE PREDICTIONS
Case*
1 2 3 1 S I 1 t 4 11
CURS
Ep5 *5.33 -13. H *2.13 *1.11 -*2.(4 *1.73 *1.21 *1.1* St.43 *7.75
Growth II 2ft -71 lit -211 23* 27* -3* 51 III
Debt/Asset 1 . 12 .31 ■ 21 .21 .34 . 12 .17 .21 . II .23
Penslon/Astet .1) -.11 -.11 .12 -.1* .1* -.23 -.IS .It . 11
AdJ/Debt .1] .47 .21 .11 .44 .13 .41 .25 .14 .12
RAD .14 . 12 .12 .14 .(7 .11 .14 .12 .11 -If
Beta I.II 1.(1 .11 1.11 . M 1.15 1. •• .11 l.ll 1.1*
Last Ptlc* *54. J7S *14.ITS *41.25 132.ITS •41.75 SSI.75 *11.(I *21.75 Iff.*25 *41.25
Mean A#spon***--Ptlc* Predictions
CNR SRl F O I M t
Footnote *5*.51 *15.(2 (35.51 * 3*.f1 *21.51 *14.3* *14.12 *23.74 *71.47 *41.(7
Balance Sheet St.54 14.11 31.13 37.21 15.52 • 1.32 1(5.11 2(. 55 7(. 71 41.(5
Adjusted Debt 57.11 17.11 31.31 31.44 35.43 7*.54 1(7.37 27. It 71.(4 45.14
ttl; F 2.31 7.(I* 2.»»* 5.11* 31.57* 2.14 4.21* 11.2(* .44 2.47
tp < 1 .11 .** .15 .11 . » .13 .(2 .11 . f 4 . 14
4 cl * tal * (a.bl* la,b|* ta.bl*
Mean Responses--Stock KRCOBNRndRtionil
CNR got EOIMt
Footnote 5.If Z.tt 1.11 (.11
Balance Sheet I. 32 ).(( 1.45 (.41
Adjusted Debt 5. 71 3.72 1.31 7.41
B2! F 1.42 2.17 1.52 2.74
(P < 1 .24 .13 .22 .(7
1.41 1.35 1.(4 1.27 4-14 (.41
(.11 (. 31 7.44 2.(7 5.71 ?.((
1.75 1.(4 1.22 1 .41 4.47 f .(7
2.(1 (. 73 1.41 3.41* 1.13 1. If
.11 .41 .14 .12 .If .32
I*)1
llh* DRbt/AiiRt cue was qlven to subjects who received • Pension/Asset 
cur, snd tht Adjusted D*bt cue hr* given to subject* who did not receive a 
Fen*lon/A*RRt cue. The Pen*ton/A**et cue ui* presented A* either a 
footnote cue or In the equivalent of a balance sheet position followinq 
the debt/asset cu* (see Appendices A I B ) . The cue was positive for 
overfunded plan* and negative for underfunded plans.
?0n a scale of I throuqh if ((--definitely would not reconaendf i n ­
definitely would recouuend)
*Slqnlficant differences;
At alpha • .15, Ift vs, bs vs, ad}/DI significant
At alpha - .117, 1*1 ft vs. bs significant
lb) ft vs. ad]/d significant
(c| bs vs. ad)/d significant
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proportions experimentwise-error rate to each comparison by 
setting alpha equal to alpha/c, where c is the number of a
priori comparisons (Dunn, 1961, Perlmutter and Myers,
1973, p.182). in this analysis there were three
comparisons so alpha was .017 (.05/3). Results of the tests
are presented in Table 8.
Hypothesis la: The test of Hla was to determine
whether the placement of pension information in the cue set 
as a footnote rather than in a balance sieet position 
affected price decisions.
Hla: There are no significant differences in stock
price predictions between subjects who receive 
a footnote pension cue and those who receive the 
cue in a balance sheet position (s/ft and fa/ft 
vs. s/bs and fa/bs) .
The price predictions of the subjects who received the 
footnote pension cue were compared to the predictions of 
the subjects who received the pension cue in a balance 
sheet position. The test of Hla was to determine whether 
the FASB was correct in its expectation that the form in 
which pension information is presented affects investment 
decisions.4 The tests were significant for Cases 4, 5, 7
and 8, but not for case 2 or 3.5
The expectation of the hypothesis test was that there
^The test of Hla could not determine if pension 
information is treated as a component of debt. Hypotheses 
lb and lc were used to test for the equivalence of the 
pension cues and the leverage cues.
5In case 2, the t-value approached significance (t = 
1.99, p = .048).
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TABLE 8
TESTS OP HYPOTHESES la, lb AND 1c 
GROUP DIFFERENCES IN STOCK PRICE PREDICTIONS
Hla : Footnote Cue vs. Balance Sheet Pension Cue
Case Pension 
Cue Value
t Prob t <
2 -.11 1. 99 . 048
3 -.09 -0. 34 . 738
4 . 12 3.47* . 001
5 -.10 -6.82* . 000
7 -.23 -2.73* .007
8 -.05 -3.21* . 002
Hlb: Footnote Cue vs. Adjusted Debt/Asset Cue
Case pension 
Cue Value
t Prob t <
2 -.11 -1. 70 . 089
3 -.09 -2. 14 . 030
4 . 12 1. 80 . 074
5 -.10 -6.84* . 000
7 23 -2.41* . 017
8 -.05 -4.34* . 000
Hlc: Balance Sheet Pension Cue vs. 
Debt/Asset cue
Adj usted
Case Pension 
Cue value
t Prob t <
2 -. 11 -3.74* . 000
3 -.09 -1.83 . 069
4 . 12 -1. 69 . 093
5 -. 10 -0. 01 .999
7 -.23 -0.33 . 741
8 -.05 -1. 14 . 257
•Significant using the Bonferroni-t, alpha (.05/3) . 017
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would be no differences between the groups' price decisions 
if both forms of the pension cue had the same impact on 
decisions. The effect of the pension information on market 
values should be similar to the effect of leverage 
information. If two companies were identical in every 
respect except for the degree of leverage, the company with 
the larger debt/asset ratio should have a lower equity 
value (Miller and Modigliani, 1958, 1963). In this 
research, subjects who used the pension information should 
make lower (higher) price predictions for cases with 
underfunded (overfunded) plans than subjects who ignored 
the pension information.
The significant results of the test of Hla for four of 
the cases suggest that in those four cases pension 
information presented as a footnote did not have the same 
impact on price decisions as pension information presented 
in a balance sheet position. The cell means presented in 
Appendix F were examined to determine the direction of the 
differences among the cases. In Case 4, the pension 
footnote referred to an overfunded plan, and the groups who 
received a pension footnote forecasted a higher future 
stock price for the case than the groups with the balance 
sheet pension cue. Cases 5, 7 and 8 had underfunded plans.
In these cases, the groups with the footnote disclosures 
forecasted lower prices for the stock. Apparently in the 
four cases the footnote format had a greater negative or
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positive impact on price decisions than the same 
information presented as a balance sheet equivalent. This 
effect could be due to the inclusion of descriptive pension 
information on the same pages as the cases. The same 
effect would not necessarily have been true if the subjects 
had been dealing with a full set of financial statements 
where the pension footnote is not prominently displayed.
Hypotheses lb: Hypotheses lb and lc provided some
evidence as to whether the subjects used the pension 
information as a component of corporate leverage.
Hypothesis lb compared groups which had received the 
footnote cue to groups that had received the adjusted 
debt/asset ratio.
Hlb: There are no significant differences in stock
price predictions between subjects who receive a 
footnote pension cue and those who receive an 
adjusted debt/asset cue (s/ft and fa/ft vs. 
s/adjD and fa/adjD).
The hypothesis was intended to determine whether 
subjects treated the footnote pension cue as a component of 
corporate debt. Rejection of Hlb would occur if subjects 
did not use the pension cue to make an adjustment to the 
debt/asset ratio The differences were significant only 
for Cases 5, 7, and 8. in those cases the groups with the 
footnote disclosures made lower price predictions than the 
groups with the adjusted debt/asset ratio. Apparently in 
these three instances, the footnote disclosures were not 
treated as the equivalent of debt. There is no obvious
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reason why significant differences occurred on these 
particular cases. Case 7 represented the highest level of 
underfunding with a cue value of -0.23, but in Case 8, the 
pension cue value was only -.05. However, the results were 
consistent with the outcome of Hla. in some instances, the 
underfunded pension footnote appeared to have a more 
negative impact on stock price predictions than the 
equivalent leverage information.
Hypothesis lc: Hypothesis lc represented a comparison
between groups who received the pension cue as a balance 
sheet equivalent and those who received the adjusted 
debt/asset cue.
Hlc: There are no significant differences in stock
price predictions between subjects who receive 
the pension cue in a balance sheet position and 
those who receive an adjusted debt/asset cue 
(s/bs and fa/bs vs. s/adjD and fa/adjDJ.
Rejection of Hlc would occur if subjects who received 
the pension cue in a balance sheet position did not treat 
the information as a component of corporate leverage. Case
2 was the only case for which significant differences 
existed among the groups. In Case 2, the pension plan was 
underfunded with a pension cue value of -.11. The groups 
with the separate pension cues made lower price predictions 
on average than the groups with the adjusted debt/asset 
ratio. in this one case, the separate pension cue was not
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weighed as an equivalent of corporate debt and Hlc could be 
re jected.6
Summary of the Tests of the Effect of Cue Set Format on 
Stock Price predictions
The results of the hypotheses tests of the effect of 
cue set format on stock price predictions are presented in 
Table 9. The tests of HI# Hla, Hlb and Hlc showed that the 
form in which the pension information was presented did 
affect stock price predictions for Cases 2, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 
8. The cue set format had a significant effect on price 
decisions for all the cases with underfunded pension plans, 
but only affected the price decision for one overfunded 
case. There was some evidence that the footnote cue did 
not have the same effect on decisions as the balance sheet 
equivalent pension cue (Hla) and that the footnote cue did 
not affect price decisions in the same way as leverage 
information (Hlb). Comparisons of group means for 
significant difference between subjects who received the 
footnote cue and those who received the other two cue set 
formats suggest that the subjects who received the footnote 
cue viewed the footnote pension information as having more 
of an effect on firm value than the equivalent balance
^Pairwise comparisons between groups were conducted 
using a Scheffe test. Both the student subjects and the 
financial analysts who received the balance sheet pension 
cue made lower stock price predictions than student 
subjects and financial analysts who received the adjusted 
debt/asset ratio. However, only the differences between 
the two groups of student subjects were statistically 
significant.
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TABLE 9
SUMMARY OF THE TESTS OF THE EFFECT 
OF CUE SET FORMAT ON STOCK PRICE PREDICTIONS
C a s e
1 2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Hypothesis
Hi: Footnote
vs. Balance 
Sheet vs.
Adjusted Debt * * * * * *
Hla: Footnote vs.
Balance Sheet * * * *
Hlb: Footnote vs.
Adjusted Debt * * *
Hlc*. Balance Sheet 
vs. Adjusted 
Debt *
* HI significant at alpha * ,05 
Hla, Hlb, and Hlc significant at alpha =* .017
sheet presentation (Hla) or leverage information (Hlb).
Subjects who received the footnote cue made lower (higher)
stock price predictions for cases with underfunded
(overfunded) plans than did the subjects who received the
balance sheet presentation or the adjusted debt/asset 
ratio. The balance sheet presentation of the pension cue 
may have been easier for subjects to interpret as a 
component of the firm's leverage than the footnote cue.
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Tests of the Effect of Cue Set Format on Stock pur chase 
Recommendations)
Hypothesis 2 : Subject purchase recommendations for
the ten cases were used as dependent variables in 
Hypotheses 2, 2a, 2b and 2c. Mean purchase recommendations 
for the ten cases are presented in Appendix G. The overall 
effect of the cue set format on the purchase 
recommendations was tested in H2:
H2: There are no significant differences in purchase
recommendations among subjects who receive 
different forms of the cue set (s/ft and fa/ft 
vs. s/bs and fa/bs vs. s/adjD and fa/adjD).
Hypothesis 2 was tested following the same steps of 
profile analysis conducted in the test of HI.7 The F-value 
of the univariate test for interaction was 385.81 (p =
.000). The critical F-value using the same conservative 
estimate of e used in the test of Hi was 3.06. The 
univariate test supported rejection of the hypothesis of no 
interaction between and the between-subject factors, and 
the multivariate tests results were consistent with the 
univariate test.8
Because of the presence of significant interaction, H2 
was tested using separate ANOVAs for each case and the
7Normality was assessed using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
test for the ten recommendations in the six groups.
Seventeen of the 60 cells were not normally distributed at 
an alpha level of .05. Therefore, primary reliance was 
placed on the e-adjusted results of the test for interaction.
8Pillai's criterion was .94 (p * .000) and Wilk's 
lambda was .87 (p * .000).
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results are summarized in Table 7. The cue set factor was 
significant only for Case 8. Even though the cue set 
factor was significant for six of the price predictions, 
apparently the effect was generally not strong enough to 
carry over to the purchase recommendation task. However, 
many cases which were significant in the test of HI had low 
p-values in the test of H2, even though they were not 
significant at an alpha level of .05.9 There is no 
apparent reason why the cue set factor was significant only 
in Case 8 and not in any other case. However, Hypotheses 
2a through 2c and the cell means were examined to determine 
the source of the significant effect.
Hypotheses 2a: Hypothesis 2a, like Hla, was a
comparison between subjects who received the pension cue in 
footnote form and those who received it as a balance sheet 
equivalent :
H2a: There are no significant differences in purchase
recommendations between subjects who receive a 
footnote pension cue and those who receive the 
pension cue in a balance sheet position (s/ft 
and fa/ft vs. s/bs and fa/bs) .
Using a protected alpha of .017 as in the test of Hla, 
H2a was rejected for Case 8 (t * -2.63, p » .01). An 
examination of cell means, presented in Table 7, shows that 
the subjects who received the pension cue as a footnote 
made lower (i. e. less favorable) purchase recommendations
leases 2, 3, 4, and 7 had p-value3 < .15 (see Table
7) .
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than the subjects who received the pension cue as a balance 
sheet equivalent. This result was consistent with the 
outcome of the test of Hla, which used price prediction as 
the dependent variable.
Tests of the Effects of the Pension Cue vs. the 
Adjusted Debt/Asset Ratio on Purchase Recommendations (H2b
ana~H7cH
Hypothesis 2b and 2c were:
H2b: There are no significant differences in purchase
recommendations between subjects who receive a 
footnote pension cue and those who receive an 
adjusted debt/asset ratio (s/ft and fa/ft vs. 
s/adjD and fa/adjD).
H2c: There are no significant differences in purchase
recommendations between subjects who receive the 
pension cue in a balance sheet position and 
those who receive an adjusted debt/asset cue
(s/bs and fa/bs vs. s/adjD and fa/adjD),
Hypothesis 2b, which compared subjects who received the
footnote pension cue with those who received the adjusted
debt/asset ratio, was not rejected. Hypothesis 2c, which
compared subjects who received the balance sheet cue with
those who received the adjusted debt/asset ratio, also
could not be rejected.
Therefore, overall the research found very little 
evidence that the cue set factor affected the purchase 
recommendations. The significant differences found in
and p-values for H2b and H2c on Case 8 were 
t » -2.19, p * .03 and t* .44, p * .66 respectively.
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Case 8 appear to be due primarily to the responses of the 
student subjects who received the footnote pension c u e . H  
The general lack of a significant cue set effect may 
have occurred because the differences in price predictions, 
although statistically significant, were not large enough 
to carry over to the purchase recommendations, made on an 
eleven-point scale. Another possible explanation is that 
although subjects were asked to base their purchase 
recommendations on predicted price appreciation, other cues 
may have influenced their decisions more than the price 
appreciation they predicted. Subjects may have also have 
put less effort into developing precise purchase 
recommendations than in predicting stock prices because the 
stock price prediction was the only experimental task for 
which accuracy was rewarded with a cash prize. They may 
have felt that a purchase recommendation was unrealistic 
given the lack of information about the hypothetical 
customer .
Tests of Achievement Measures
The Linear Model. There were two different 
environmental models used in the data analysis. The
11Pairwise comparisons between groups were conducted 
using a Scheffe test. The student subjects who received 
the footnote cue made significantly lower purchase 
recommendations than any of the three groups of financial 
analysts, including the group of analysts who received the 
footnote cue.
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environmental models were derived by using actual stock 
prices (Ye) as the dependent variable. The standardized 
regression weights derived from the two models were used to 
determine optimal linear stock price predictions based on 
the environmental models. Optimal predictions derived from 
environmental models were necessary to calculate the 
matching coefficient, G.^-2 The first model contained the 
seven cues presented to the subjects who received a pension 
cue, either in footnote form or as a balance sheet 
equivalent. The second model had only six cues because the 
pension cue and debt/asset cue were combined into a single 
adjusted debt/asset cue. The models and standardized 
regression weights are presented in Appendix H.
In both cases the linear model performed extremely 
well. This was expected based on the results of prior 
empirical work in which similar models had performed well 
with a much larger number of companies that were not 
subject to the same restrictions placed on the cases 
selected for this research (i.e. only companies that were 
stable over the test period were selected) (Feldstein and 
Seligman, 1981). The coefficient of determination, R 2, was 
.99 for the cue set that included a separate pension cue
12The matching coefficient (G) for each subject is the 
multiple correlation of the optimal stock price prediction 
derived from the environmental model and the optimal stock 
price prediction derived from the subject's linear model.
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(P - 28.49, p - .03). The aggregation of the pension cue 
and debt/asset cue into a single adjusted debt/asset cue 
caused only a slight decrease in the predictability of the 
linear model. The r 2 of the linear model with the adjusted 
debt/asset ratio was .97 (F ■ 22.38, p - .01).
In the empirical studies reviewed in Chapter 2, 
unfunded vested benefits had a negative effect on market 
values. in this research, underfunded pension plans also 
had a significant negative effect on firm value (t = -4.55, 
p ■ .045). increases in corporate leverage had a negative 
effect on firm value, but the effect of the debt/asset cue 
on firm value was much stronger when the pension cue and 
debt/asset cue were combined into a single adjusted 
debt/asset cue in Model 2.13 Removal of the pension cue 
changed the relative importance of the cues because the 
pension cue was correlated with the other cues. When 
independent variables are correlated, the regression 
coefficient of an independent variable does not reflect the 
total effect of the variable on the dependent variable, but 
only the partial effect, given whatever other correlated 
independent variables are included in the model (Neter,
1985, p. 277). The stronger effect of the adjusted 
debt/asset cue on market value may have been due to the
13jn Model 1, the debt/asset cue had a t-value of 
-2.86 (p - .10) and in Model 2 the debt/asset cue adjusted 
for the effect of the pension information was -6.35 (p = .008).
109
correlation of the pension cue and the unadjusted 
debt/asset cue {correlation coefficient of 0.37).
The correlation matrices of the two cue sets are 
presented in Table 10 with the means and standard 
deviations of the variables. Aggregation of the pension 
cue and the debt/asset cue in Model 2 reduced the 
correlation of the leverage cue with the other cues and 
helped contribute to its higher level of significance in 
Model 2. The only high intercorrelations were between EPS 
and the unadjusted debt/asset cue { -.91) and EPS and 
PRICE83 (. 88). There is no existing test for 
multicol1inearity, and Tabachnik (1983, p. 82) suggests 
that only correlations of approximately .99 be of concern. 
However, other authors have used .80 as a rule of thumb for 
serious multicol1 inearity (judge, et a l ., 1980, p. 459 ). 
Although correlations in this research were less than .99, 
there may have been some multicollinearity. The negative 
sign on E.P.S., which was contrary to its expected sign is 
evidence of possible multicollinearity (Katz, 1982, p.
1 2 2 ) . However, multicollinearity was not a problem in
I^m u Iticol1 inearity may have occurred in this model 
because of the small number of cases (Katz, 1982, p. 123). 
There was no problem in prior market studies which used 
large samples. Increasing the number of cases in order to 
remove any multicollinearity was not practical in this 
study because of the difficulty in obtaining respondents to 
a longer questionnaire.
110
TABLE 10
VARIANCE-COVARIANCE MATRICES
MODEL 1 
PENSION CUE SET
EPS GROWTH DEBT PENS RDEV BETA LAST
PRICE
EPS 1.00 .37 -.91 -.20 -.13 -.39 .88
GROWTH 1.00 -.20 -.10 -.31 . 63 .23
DEBT 1. 00 . 37 .37 . 47 -.69
PENS 1. 00 .07 -.02 . 15
RDEV 1.00 -.17 -.10
BETA 1. 00 -.39
PRICES 3 1.00
MODEL 2
ADJUSTED DEBT/ASSET CUE SET
EPS GROWTH
ADJ
DEBT RDEV BETA
LAST
PRICE
EPS 1.00 .37 -.60 -.13 -.39 .88
GROWTH 1. 00 -.17 -.31 .63 . 23
DEBT 1 . 00 . 24 . 23 -.25
RDEV 
BETA 
PR ICE 8 3
1. 00 -.17
1.00
-. 10 
-.39 
1 . 00
MEAN STANDARD DEVIATION
EPS 3.04 3. 80
GROWTH 0. 09 0 . 16
DEBT 0.21 0.09
PENS 0. 02 0.12
ADJ.DEBT 0.22 0.17
RDEV 0. 04 0.02
BETA 1.07 0.21
PRICE83 48. 00 22. 14
Ill
interpreting the results of this research because the 
purpose of the regression analysis was to make inferences 
about overall response functions, not to study individual 
cue weightings (Neter, et al ., 1985, p. 389 ).
In addition to the environmental linear models, 
regression models were developed for each subject using the 
subject's price predictions to determine predicted market 
values as the dependent variable in the regression. These 
189 individual regression models were used to derivt the 
achievement measures used in the following hypotheses 
tests.
Tests of the Effects of Cue set Format and Subject 
Expertise on Stock Price Prediction Achievement (H3a, H3b 
and H3c)
Hypotheses 3a, 3b, and 3c examined the effect of the 
cue set format and the subject's level of expertise on the 
mean square error of the subject’s stock price predictions 
(MSE), his ability to match his decision model to the 
appropriate environmental model (G, the multiple 
correlation of the optimal price predictions based on the 
environmental model and the subject’s linear model), and 
the consistency with which the subject followed his 
decision model (RS, the multiple correlation of the 
subject's actual price predictions and the optimal 
predictions derived from his linear model):
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H3a: There are no significant differences among
subjects who receive different cue set 
formats and who have different levels of 
expertise in the mean square error (MSE) of 
their stock price predictions.
H3b; There are no significant differences among
subjects who receive different cue set formats 
and who have different levels of expertise in 
their ability to match their decision models to 
the appropriate environmental model (G).
H3c: There are no significant differences among
subjects who receive different cue set formats 
and who have different levels of expertise in 
the consistency with which they follow their 
decision models (Rs).
The effect of case order was also included as a 
factor in the univariate models. Two different orders of 
presentation for the cases had been administered to the 
subjects to determine whether results were dependent on the 
order in which cases were presented.I5 A summary of group 
means on the dependent variables in presented in Table 11.
Hypothesis 3a, 3b, and 3c were tested using a three- 
factor ANOVA model with cue set format, subject expertise, 
and case order as the three factors. Nonparametric 
analysis was also used because of the failure
l5The profile analysis results included in the 
previous section were based on a model which included case 
order as a factor . Case order was not significant in any 
of the tests.
TABLE 11
GROUP MEANS ON MSE, G, RS, AND RA
CUE SET FORMAT
Footnote Balance
Sheet
Adj usted 
Debt/Asset 
Ra t io
Row Mean
EXPERTISE
Student
MSE
G
RS
RA
61/748 
. 5500 
. 8884 
. 6077
34,207 
. 7684 
. 9239 
.8016
30,250 
. 7699 
. 8775 
. 8110
41,811 
. 6977 
.8962 
. 7416
F inane ia1 
Analyst 
MSE
G
RS
RA
35,658 
. 7608 
. 9202 
. 7771
16,746 
. 8830 
. 9306 
. 8823
18,581 
. 8853 
. 9245 
.8895
23 , 395 
. 8447
.9253 
. 8511
Column
Mean
MSE
G
RS
RA
48, 489 
. 6571 
. 9046 
. 6938
24,931 
. 8293 
. 9275 
. 8445
24,416 
. 8276 
.9010 
. 8503
32,360 
. 7731 
.9111 
. 7978
MSE = mean square error of subjects' price predictions
G (Matching) = multiple correlation of the optimal price
predictions based on the environmental model 
and the subject's linear model
RS (Consistency) * multiple correlation of the subject's
actual price predictions and the optimal 
predictions based on his linear model
RA (Achievement) - multiple correlation of actual stock
prices and the subject's price 
predict ions
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to meet the assumptions underlying the parametric tests.16
The nonparametric tests applied to an ANOVA design 
such as the Friedman test and the Quade test are tests for 
main effects of a single factor (Conover, 19B0, pp. 295- 
305). An alternative recommended in experimental designs 
for which there is no equivalent nonparametric tests is to 
use the parametric ANOVA on the data and then use the same 
procedure on rank transformed data. if the two procedures 
give the same results, the usual ANOVA assumptions are 
probably reasonable and the regular parametric analysis is 
valid, but if results of the two tests are substantially 
different, the analysis on ranks is probably more ac c ur at e 
(Conover, 1980, p. 337). Dual parametric and nonparametric 
testing was employed in the subsequent analysis.
H3a: Mean Square Error (MSE): The results of the
test on MSE, G and RS are presented in Table 12.
l6The normality assumption for MSE, G and RS was 
tested using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. Both MSE and G 
were normally distributed in all six cells. However, the 
null hypothesis of normality was rejected in 4 of the 6 
cells for R S . Four transformations were tried to achieve 
normality. RS was transformed using the square root of the 
original variable, the inverse of the original variable, 
the natural log of the original variable, and the original 
variable squared. None of the transformations corrected 
the normality departure.
Tests for homogeneity of variance are extremely 
sensitive to departures from normality (Box, 1953). 
Therefore, this assumption was not tested for R S . The 
Bartlett-Box F test, was used to test for homogeneity of 
variance in the ANOVA models using MSE and G as dependent 
variables. For both variables, the assumption of 
homogeneous variances was rejected. In the test of MSE, 
Bartlett-Box F equaled 7.77, p - .000. In the test of G, 
Bartlett-Box F equaled 7.35, p * .000.
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TABLE 12 
HYPOTHESES 3a, 3b, AND 3c 
ANOVA RESULTS
Parametric Nonparametric
F Prob F > F Prob F>
H3a: Effect of CueSet format and Expertise on Mean square
Error (MSE - f(Ye^ - ysi)2/n)
Cue Set 2 7.88* .000 25.16* . 000
Expert ise 37.83* . 000 46.62* . 000
Order . 10 .747 . 85 . 359
Cue Set X Expertise 2 . 47 . 087 2. 14 . 121
Cue Set X Order . 67 . 511 1. 26 . 287
Expertise X order 1. 79 .183 3. 51 . 062
Cue Set X Expertise
X Order .63 . 563 * 00 00 . 415
H3b: Effect of Cue Set Format and Expertise on Matching
(G = multiple correlation of Ye and Ys)
Cue Set 32.28* . 000 34.94* . 000
Exper t i se 54.83* .000 80.09* . 000
Order .41 .521 . 10 .754
Cue Set X Expertise 3 . 08* . 048 1.15 . 321
Cue Set X Order 1.19 . 307 1. 78 .172
Expert ise X Order I. 32 . 251 2. 72 .101
Cue Set x Expertise
X Order . 29 . 748 1.31 . 272
H3c: Effect of Cue Set Format and Expertise^on Consistency
(RS * multiple correlation of Ys and y s )
Cue Set 2. 55 .081 8. 29* . 000
Exper t ise 9.82* .002 . 78 . 378
Order 1. 31 .255 . 30 . 587
Cue Set X Expert ise 1.12 . 327 . 06 . 941
Cue Set X Order 1. 22 . 302 3.74* . 026
Expertise X Order . 16 .687 . 17 . 842
Cue Set x Expertise
X Order .29 .748 1.31 .272
‘Significant at alpha * .05
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In the test of MSE, the parametric and nonparametric 
tests yielded the same results. Boch the cue set factor 
and the level of expertise factor were highly significant 
with p-values of .000. There was also no significant 
interaction among any of the factors. Therefore,
Hypothesis 3a was rejected. The MSE of the subjects' price 
predictions was affected by both the cue set format and the 
subject's level of expertise.17 The cell means in Table 11 
show that the financial analysts made more accurate 
predictions than the student subjects, which was expected 
given their greater experience. Subjects who received the 
footnote pension cue displayed a larger MSE than the 
subjects who received the pension cue in the equivalent of 
a balance sheet position or an adjusted debt/asset ratio. 
Apparently the subjects who received the footnote cue had 
more difficulty determining the importance of the cue on 
stock prices than the subjects who received the other two 
forms of the cue set. The significance of these 
differences was tested in Hypotheses 4a through 4c and 5a 
through 5c.
H3b: Matching (G) : There was significant interaction
between the cue set factor and the expertise factor when 
the ANOVA model for G was analyzed (H3b) . An examination 
of cell means for the variable G {presented in Table 11)
17The hypothesis of no effect of case order on MSE was 
not rejected (p ■ .747 and p « .359 for the parametric and 
nonparametric tests respectively).
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suggests the interaction effect was primarily associated 
with the footnote cue set. There was a larger difference 
in the performance of the students and the analysts in that 
treatment than in the other two cue set manipulations. To 
determine the significance of the main effects, a series of 
ANOVAs were done holding the levels of the two interacting 
factors constant.18 The results are presented in Table 13.
The parametric and nonparametric tests were consistent 
in all the tests of the various combinations of factor 
levels. The order of the cases did not have a significant 
effect on responses in any of the tests. Both the 
expertise factor and the cue set factor were significant. 
Therefore the hypothesis that neither cue set format nor 
subject expertise affects the ability of subjects to 
capture environmental relationships was rejected.
H3b; Consistency (Rs): The tests on subject
consistency, RS, were the only tests for which the 
parametric and nonparametric tests produced conflicting 
results. The parametric test identified the expertise 
factor as significant (p - .002) and the cue set factor as 
nonsignificant (p » .081). in the results of the
ISAn interaction effect complicates the interpretation 
of the significance of the main effects. Results of the 
two-factor ANOVA cannot be used directly to conclude that 
there is a difference in matching among subjects with 
different cue sets because the difference is not the same 
across both levels of expertise. Therefore, two one-factor 
models were used (Berenson, et al . , 1983 ,p. 153).
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TABLE 13
TEST OF HYPOTHESIS 3b WITH CONTROL FOR INTERACTION
Parametric Nonparametric
F Prob F > F Prob F>
Footnote Cue
Expertise 22.11* .000 21.31* .000
Order . 96 . 331 1.25 . 269
Expertise X Order . 43 . 516 1. 33 .259
Balance Sheet Equi valent Pension Cue
Expertise 22.50* 
Order .80 
Expertise X Order 2.29
. 000 
, 374 
.135
42.06*
. 57 
3.97
. 000 
.455 
. 051
Adjusted Debt/Asset Cue
Expertise 13.22* . 001 19,57* . 000
Order ,90 . 346 1.85 . 179
Expertise x Order .00 .952 . 09 . 771
Student Subject
Cue Set 13.52* . 000 19.86* .000
Order 2.80 .098 1.90 . 172
Cue Set X Order 2. 18 .119 2.82 .065
Financial Analyst
Cue Set 19.89* . 000 16. 25* . 000
Or de r . 09 . 760 .91 . 343
Cue Set X Order . 16 .851 , 21 .814
‘significant at alpha « .05
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nonparametric tests, the cue set factor was significant 
(p * .000), but the level of subject expertise was not 
significant (p » .378). One of the differences in results 
could be resolved by testing for significance in the 
parametric model after pooling for nonsignificant 
interaction terms. After pooling, the cue set factor was 
significant (F ■ 2.98, p - .053). Because the original RS 
variable contained substantial departures from the ANOVA 
assumptions, the rank analysis was used to test H3c. The 
results indicated H3c could not be rejected; consistency is 
not affected by subjects expertise.
The ANOVA on ranked data revealed an interaction 
between the cue set factor and the case order which was not 
present in the unranked data.19 The groups with the second 
case order and the adjusted debt/asset ratio had a higher 
ranking than the corresponding groups with the first order 
of cases. The reverse was true for the groups with the 
other two cue set formats. Separate ANOVAs were run 
holding the various levels of the cue set factor and the 
order factor constant. The cue set factor was significant
l^Hora and Conover (1984) caution against the 
construction of tests for interaction using scores because 
there is no existing theory that provides a corresponding 
test to the parametric theory for interaction. interaction 
may exist in the raw scores, but not in the rank- 
transformed scores, or vice versa. Therefore, results of 
the parametric and nonpaTameTrTc tests for interaction may 
be inconsistent.
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regardless of the case o r d e r . 20 However, the case order 
did not produce significant differences among the groups. 
Based on these results, the hypothesis that the consistency 
with which subjects apply their decision models is affected 
by neither the format of the cue set nor the subject's 
level of expertise (H3c) was rejected only for the cue set 
factor. The research failed to find evidence that 
expertise affects consistency, although the mean Rs was 
higher for the financial analysts under all three cue set 
formats.
The Effect of Cue Set Format on Achievement (H4a, H4b, and 
H4c) : A Priori Comparisons'
Hypotheses 4a, 4b and 4c were tested using MSE, G, and 
RS. The results of these tests are presented in Table 14.
Hypothesis 4a: Hypothesis 4a was:
H4a: There are no significant differences in the
accuracy of stock price predictions between 
subjects who receive a footnote pension cue and
subjects who receive the pension cue in a
balance sheet position (s/ft and fa/ft vs. s/bs 
and fa/bs) .
The purpose of H4a was to determine whether subjects' 
achievement would be affected by the placement of the 
pension cue in a footnote versus placement in a balance 
sheet position, if the FASB is correct in its view that
20 Holding case order constant at level l, the F-value 
of the cue set factor was 11.12 (p « .000). Testing the 
model with the second order, the F-value of the cue set 
factor was 8.29 (p « .001).
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TABLE 14
HYPOTHESES TESTS 4a, 4b AND 4c 
THE EFFECT OF CUE SET FORMAT ON ACHIEVEMENT
Parametr ic Nonparametric
t Prob t> t Prob
: Footnote cue vs. balance sheet pension cue
MSE 6. 60* . 000 5.99* . 000
G -7.13* . 000 -7.13* .000
RS -1.95 . 052 -4.82* . 000
i: Footnote cue vs. adj usted debt/asset ratio
MSE 6. 91* . 000 6. 69* . 000
G -7.22* . 000 -7.71* . 000
RS 0. 28 . 780 -1.24 . 217
:: Balance sheet pensi on cue vs. adjusted debt/asset
ratio
MSE 0.31 . 760 0 . 70 .483
G -0.79 .937 -.584 . 560
RS 2.26 .025 2.92* .004
•Significant using the Bonferroni-t, alpha « (.05/6) . 008
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pension footnote disclosures are not integrated into 
investment decisions, subjects who received the pension cue 
in the equivalent of a balance sheet position or the 
adjusted debt/asset cue should have higher levels of 
achievement than subjects who received the footnote pension 
cue.21 using the Bonferroni-1 , the significance level was 
set at .008.22 Significant differences existed between 
subjects who received two different forms of the pension 
cue on all three measures of achievement.23 The group 
means in Table 11 show that the subjects who received the 
footnote pension cue had a much higher MSE and lower value 
of G. The measure of consistency, RS, was also somewhat 
lower for subjects with the pension footnote than subjects 
with the balance sheet pension cue, but the differences 
between the two student groups were the primary source of
2lThe subj ects who received the footnote cue were 
compared to the subjects who received the adjusted 
debt/asset cue in H4a.
22There were six comparisons overall, so alpha was 
equal to (.05/6), or .008.
23The outcomes of the parametric and nonparametric 
tests were consistent for MSE and G, but the parametric and 
nonparametric tests of RS did not support the sa;ue 
conclusions. The t-statistic of the parametric test was 
-1.95, with a p-value of .052, but the nonparametric test 
was highly significant (t ■ -7.12, p ■ .00). The 
nonparametric test was probably more sensitive than the 
parametric test of r s because of the variable's non-normal 
distribution (Conover, 1982, p. 337). Based on the 
nonparametric results, the hypothesis of no differences in 
consistency between groups with the footnote pension cue 
and those with the balance sheet pension cue was rejected.
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group differences. The financial analysts had almost the 
same values of RS/ .92 and .93 respectively.
The results of the test of H4a on the variable G can 
be compared to the results of Hla, which tested whether 
stock price predictions would be affected by the placement 
of the pension cue in the cue set. The test of Hla showed 
that subjects tended to place a different emphasis on the 
footnote cue than the balance sheet pension cue when making 
some price decisions. The subjects who received the 
footnote cue apparently did not use as appropriate a linear 
model as that used by the groups with the pension cue in a 
balance sheet position. Subjects who received the footnote 
cue had an average matching index (G) of .65 and subjects 
who received the balance sheet cue had a matching index of 
.83. The balance sheet pension cue, with its positive or 
negative value, may have been easier for subjects to 
assimilate as simple "good news or bad news."
Although the results of Hla were only significant for 
four cases, the overall effect of the two different pension 
cue formats on performance, when measured with summary 
correlational statistics in the test of H4a was more 
dramatic, especially for the student subjects. Based on an 
examination of group means presented in Table 11, the 
students appeared to have more trouble integrating the 
footnote cue than the balance sheet cue into their 
decisions, and were less consistent in their decisions when
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using the pension footnote, which suggests the FASB’s 
recognition requirements might improve decision-making by 
less experienced financial statement users.
Hypothesis 4b: Hypothesis 4b tested for differences
between subjects who received the footnote pension cue and 
subjects who received the adjusted debt/asset cue:
H4b: There are no significant differences in the
accuracy of stock price predictions between 
subjects who receive a footnote pension cue and
subjects who receive an adjusted debt/asset cue
(s/ft and fa/ft vs. s/adjD and fa/adjD).
The results of these tests were also significant for MSE
and G, but not for RS. The weighted average MSE of the
subjects with the footnote pension cue was higher than the
mean of the subjects with the adjusted debt/asset r a t i o . 24
These results were consistent with expectations prior to
the statistical analysis. The adjusted debt/asset ratio
was easier to combine in a prediction model than the
footnote pension cue. Subjects may have found the
additional information presented in the pension footnote
confusing. The test of H4b using G as a dependent variable
was consistent with the test of H4b using MSE as the
dependent variable. The groups with the adjusted
debt/asset ratio displayed a higher level of matching than
the groups with the footnote pension cue.
24<rhe average MSE of the subjects who received the 
footnote pension cue was 48,489 and the average MSE of the 
subjects who received the adjusted debt/asset ratio was 
24,416.
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The test of H4b using RS as the dependent variable was 
not significant, and a comparison of cell means shows that 
differences among groups in consistency was very slight.25 
Although subjects had more difficulty predicting stock 
prices when using a cue set with a footnote pension cue, 
the consistency with which they made their decisions was 
not affected by the presence of the pension cue.
Hypothesis 4c: Hypothesis 4c was a comparison between
subjects who received the pension cue in a balance sheet
equivalent position and those who received the adj us ted
debt/asset ratio:
H4c: There are no significant differences in the
accuracy of stock price predictions between 
subjects who receive the pension cue in a 
balance sheet position and subjects who receive 
an adjusted debt/asset cue (s/bs and fa/bs vs. 
s/adjD and fa/adjd),
There were no significant differences in MSE or G 
between subjects who received the balance sheet pension cue 
and those who received the adjusted debt/asset ratio.
The nonparametric test for differences in consistency 
(RS) between subject groups who received the balance sheet 
pension cue and those who received the adjusted debt/asset 
ratio was significant, although the parametric test was 
not. The subjects who received the balance sheet cue were 
slightly more consistent than the subjects who received the
25The mean consistency of the subjects who received 
the footnote pension cue was .9049 and the mean consistency 
of the subjects who received the adjusted debt/asset ratio 
was .9010.
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adjusted debt/asset ratio (overall means of .9275 and .9010 
respectively). Although statistically significant 
differences existed in the ranked data, the parametric 
means suggest that the addition of an additional pension 
cue had only a slight effect on consistency.
A Summary of the Effect of Cue set Format on Stock Price 
Predict ion Achievement
The tests of Hypotheses 3a through 3c and 4a through 
4c support the conclusion that the cue set format did have 
an effect on subject achievement. The effect was primarily 
associated with differences between subjects who received 
the footnote cue and the other experimental groups. The 
inclusion of the cue description and special placement of 
the cue may have lead the subjects to pay too much or too 
little attention to the cue because subjects who received 
the cue as a balance sheet item did better with the same 
information in a slightly different format. In comparing 
group means on G, there was very little difference between 
the means of the subjects who received the balance sheet 
pension cue and the means of the subjects who received the 
adjusted debt/asset cue. The results suggest that the 
subjects with the balance sheet cue did incorporate the 
pension information into their decisions with less 
difficulty than the subjects who received the footnote 
pension cue.
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The Effect of Subject Expertise on Stock Price prediction 
Achievement (H5a, flsb, ana H5C): A Priori comparisons
The final three hypotheses were comparisons of the 
student subjects and financial analysts:
H5a; There are no significant differences in the 
accuracy of stock price predictions between 
professional analysts who receive a footnote 
pension cue and student subjects who receive the 
same cue set (s/ft vs. fa/ft).
H5b: There are no significant differences in the
accuracy of stock price predictions between 
professional analysts who receive the pension 
cue in a balance sheet position and student 
subjects who receive the same cue set {s/bs vs. 
fa/bs).
H5c: There are no significant differences in the
accuracy of stock price predictions between 
professional analysts who receive an adjusted 
debt/asset ratio and student subjects who 
receive the same cue set <s/adjD vs. fa/adjD).
The tests of H3a and H3b showed that subject expertise 
did have a significant effect on MSE and G. Hypotheses 5a 
through 5c made pairwise comparisons between groups of 
student subjects and financial analysts who received the 
same cue set. The dependent variables in the analysis were 
MSE, G, and R A , the overall correlational measure of 
a c h i e v e m e n t . 26 Hypothesis 5a was a comparison of student 
and analysts subjects who received a footnote pension cue. 
Hypothesis 5b was a comparison of student and analyst 
subjects who received the pension cue in the equivalent of
26r s could only be used as a dependent variable when 
subjects who had the same environmental constraints on 
achievement (R-squared) were compared.
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a balance sheet position, and H5c was a comparison of 
student subjects and financial analysts who received the 
adjusted debt/asset cue.
The hypotheses were tested to determine whether a 
change in reporting format would affect the relative 
performance of the student subjects versus the financial 
analysts. The results are presented in Table 15. All 
three hypotheses were rejected for all three dependent 
variables. The comparison of cell means presented in 
Table 11 shows that the professional analysts did better 
than the student subjects, regardless of the format of the 
cue set. However, differences between the groups receiving 
the footnote cue were more pronounced than in the other two 
sets of comparisons. The financial analysts were better 
able to give the footnote cue its appropriate weight than 
the student subjects. The results of the tests support the 
conclusion that changes in reporting format will not remove 
the advantage of experienced analysts over more naive 
subjects, but the inclusion of the pension information in 
the adjusted debt/asset ratio did narrow the gap between 
the two groups of subjects substantially. The significant 
differences between the student subjects and financial 
analysts also suggest that student subjects are 
inappropriate surrogates for professional financial 
analysts.
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TABLE 15
HYPOTHESES TESTS 5a, 5b, AND 5c
THE EFFECT OF EXPERTISE ON ACHIEVEMENT
Parametrie Nonparametric
t Prob t> t Prob t>
H5a: Subjects who received the footnote pension cue
MSE -5.19* . 000 -3.29* . 001
G 6.17* . 000 4. 58* . 000
_ . * ARA 5.67* . 000 2. 21 . 028
H5b: Subjects who received the balance sheet pension cue
MSE -3.55* .000 -5.87* .000
G 3.43* .001 6.54* .000
RA 2.76* .006 3.27* .000
: Subjects who recei ved the the adjusted debt/asset
ratio
MSE -2 . 37 . 018 -3.34* . 001
G 3. 46* . 001 4. 79* . 000
RA 2.70* . 008 3.39* . 001
*Signif icant using the Bonf er r oni-1 , a1pha - (.05/6) =
. 008 .
* RA was used a an achievement measure because comparisons 
were between groups of subjects who received the same cue 
set .
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Demographic Data
Financial Analysts
The demographic data is summarized in Table 16. 
Respondents were located in 20 states, and were generally 
experienced analysts with strong educational b a c k g r o u n d s . 27 
Seventy-five per cent had from 6 to 10 years experience,
70% indicated they had earned a graduate degree, and 22% of 
the respondents were CFAs. Most of the respondents 
described their current line of business as portfolio
management or financial planning.
Student Subjects
Although the student subjects were taken from graduate 
classes in only two universities, they represented a broad 
range of academic backgrounds. Thirty-four different 
undergraduate institutions located in seventeen states and 
one foreign country were represented. Other demographic 
characteristics are summarized in Table 17. The majority 
of the student subjects concentrated in engineering (36%) 
or business (28%) as undergraduates. The number of 
accounting and finance courses taken by the student 
subjects supports the assumption that they had a reasonable 
understanding of financial statements without necessarily
2?Location of the respondent was determined from the 
return envelope when the respondent did not identify 
himself on the questionnaire.
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TABLE 16
DEMOGRAPHIC DATA— FINANCIAL ANALYSTS
Education
Some College 
Undergraduate Degree 
Graduate Degree
Count* percentage
2
24
70
2 . 1 
25.0 
72.9
Line of Business
Brokerage Firm 8 8.2
Investment Banking 5 5.2
Commercial Banking 14 14.4
Financial Planning 17 17.5
Portfolio Management 36 27.1
Insurance 5 5.2
Bank Trust officer 7 7.2
Other 2 2.1
Exper ience 
0 - 2  years 
3 - 5  years 
6 to 10 years 
Over 10 years
Certification
CFA
CPA
None
Other
♦Counts differ from question 
answer all questions.
8 8.3
9 9.4
72 75.1
7 7.3
22 22.9
2 2.1
60 62.5
12 12.5
question. Subjects did not
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TABLE 17 
DEMOGRAPHIC DATA— STUDENTS
Count* Percentage
Undergraduate Major
Liberal Arts 18 19.6
Engineer ing 33 35.9
Business 26 28.3
Social Sciences 8 8.7
Other 7 7.7
Number of Accounting Courses
0 to 2 30 32 . 6
3 to 5 41 44.6
6 to 10 14 15. 2
Over 10 7 7.6
Number of Finance Courses
0 to 2 70 76. 1
3 to 5 12 13.0
6 to 10 9 9.8
Over 10 1 1.1
Business Experience
0 years 32 34 . 8
1 to 2 years 29 31.5
3 to 5 years 13 14. 1
6 to 10 years 11 12.0
Over 10 7 7.6
♦Counts differ from question to quest ion. Sub jects
answer all questions.
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having the expertise of a financial analyst. Two-thirds of 
the student subjects had taken at least three accounting 
courses, but only 24% had had at least three finance 
courses. Approximately one-third of the student subjects 
had no business experience and none were CFAs.
Summary of the Results
The results of the hypotheses tests are summarized in 
Table IB. in Cases 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, and 8, the form in which
pension information was presented affected subject price 
predictions. The effect of the cue set format was 
significant for all cases with underfunded plans and one 
case with an overfunded plan. in cases where there were 
significant effects, subjects who received the footnote 
pension cue made difference price decisions than the other 
groups of subjects. However, there was little evidence 
that the cue set factor affected subject purchase 
decisions.
The form in which the pension information was 
presented also affected the accuracy of subjects' 
predictions, measured by mean square error and the ability 
of the subjects to match the optimal environmental weighing 
of the cues. Overall, subjects who received the pension 
cue as a footnote did not do as well on any achievement 
measure as subjects who received the same information as a
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TABLE 18 
SOMMARr OP BTFOTBISIS TESTS
z . Effects of cue sst format on prlea predictions and purchase decisions
Casa
r - 2 3 "7 5 "T ""7 8 4 li
Bl: Fries prediction
Pootnots cus (ft) vs. Balsncs 
Sheet cus (bs) vs. Adjusted 
Debt/Asset cus (adj/d)
* * * * « *
His: ft vs. bs 
Bib: ft vs. a d V d  
Blc: bs vs . sd V d
* » 
*
•
*
*
•
•
B 2 : Purchase recommendation 
ft vs. bs. vs. ad]/d *
B 2 s : f t . v s . bs 
H2b: ft vs. adj/d 
Bib: bs vs. adj/d
*
II. Efface of cus sat format and expertise on:
B l a : naan aquara srror or pries predictions (MSE) 
Bib: Tbs ability of a subject of matcb his decision 
to an anvirnomantal modal (G)
B3c: Tbs consistsncy with which a subject follows 
bis decision modal (Rs)
>od*l
*
*
* (Cus sst
only)
Ill . Tbs affect of eua sat format on the accuracy o f :
B4a (ft vs. bs) B4b 
MSE *
G •
Rs •
(ft vs. ad]/d> 
•
*
H4c (bs vs. sd^/d 
*
IV. Tbs affect of axpartiaa on tbs accuracy o f :
BSa (ft) 
MSE •
C *
RA *
H5b {bs) 
*
•
•
H5c t sd}/d) 
#
*
*
* Hypothesis was rejected.
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balance sheet cue. The subjects who received the adjusted 
debt/asset cue outperformed subjects who received the 
pension cue as a footnote, but did not do significantly 
better in predicting stock prices than the subjects who 
received the pension cue in a balance sheet position. The 
results suggest that recognition of a net pension liability 
on a company's balance sheet rather than disclosure of the 
informat ion in footnotes will improve decisions.
Subject expertise affected the accuracy of the 
subjects' predictions, but not the consistency with which 
they applied their decision models. Professional analysts 
did significantly better than the student subjects in 
predicting stock prices, and the results were consistent 
using three different measures of achievement. However, 
the gap between the two groups of subjects was reduced by 
the use of the pension cue in the equivalent of a balance 
sheet position and the adjusted debt/asset ratio, which 
also lends support to the FASB's position that the change 
in reporting will improve the usefulness of financial 
statements.
CHAPTER 5
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This chapter presents the summary and major 
implications of this research project. The topics 
discussed in this chapter are the following: a summary of
the research, the implications of the research findings, 
the limitations of the research, and some suggestions for 
future research.
Summar y
In December 1985, the FASB published SFAS No. 87, 
"Employers’ Accounting for pensions." The statement was 
the culmination of an eleven-year project to make changes 
in the financial reporting of pension costs and the 
employer's obligation for future pension benefits. One of 
the major changes in financial reporting instituted by the 
new standard was the requirement that an employer recognize 
a net liability in the statement of financial position when
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his obligation to pay future pension benefits exceeds the 
fair market value of pension plan assets.
The decision to require recognition of a liability for 
unfunded pension benefits was very controversial. Many 
critics assumed that previous footnote disclosures of the 
assets and obligations of a company's pension plan had been 
ignored by financial statement users and that recognition 
would impair the financial ratios used by bankers and 
financial analysts in their evaluation of a company. ether 
opponents of the accounting change felt recognition was 
unnecessary because the information regarding the status of 
a company's pension plan was already available in the 
footnotes to the financial statements. They argued that 
disclosure is as useful to decision makers as recognition.
The FASB rejected the argument that disclosure would 
be as useful as recognition and stated its belief that 
while some sophisticated analysts might modify their 
evaluations of financial statements to reflect accompanying 
pension disclosures, most investors focus only on the body 
of the financial statements (FASB, 1985, par. 116).
Therefore, this research was designed to investigate 
whether the form in which pension information is presented 
(footnote versus disclosure) affects users' abilities to 
incorporate the information into their financial decisions. 
The secondary issue considered was whether a decision 
maker's use of pension information is affected by his
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experience in financial analysis. The underlying 
motivation for focusing on individual decisions, rather 
than market effects, was to investigage whether the pension 
reporting changes made in SFAS 87 would improve individual 
decision making as the FASB suggested. Although there was 
prior empirical work that had found that the status of a 
firm's pension plan was reflected in equity market values 
(Oldfield, 1977; Feldstein and Seligman, 1981; Daley,
1984), there has not been any research on whether 
individual users consider a company's pension plan position 
when making investment decisions.
To test the effect of pension reporting on investment 
decisions, questionnaires were administered to MBA students 
enrolled in graduate accounting classes. Questionnaires 
were also mailed to professional financial analysts. A 
total of 189 subjects participated in the study. Subjects 
were asked to estimate future stock prices and make 
purchase recommendations for ten cases based on selected 
sets of accounting and financial information cues. Cue 
sets were manipulated to reflect different ways in which 
pension information could be presented. The pension cue 
was presented in a footnote to the cue set, as a line-item 
in the cue set, which was equivalent to a balance sheet 
position, or incorporated into the debt/asset ratio.
Responses were analyzed using a repeated measures analysis 
of variance in a profile analysis framework.
139
The results of the research showed that the form In 
which pension information is presented did affect the 
subjects' price predictions, especially when pension plans 
were underfunded. Specifically, subjects who received the 
pension cue as a footnote did not always make the same 
price decisions as subjects who received a balance sheet 
pension cue or subjects who received a debt/asset ratio 
adjusted to reflect the impact of the company's pension 
plan assets and obligations. Although there was evidence 
that the cue set format affected price predictions, the 
effect generally did not carry over to subject purchase 
recommendations. The cue set factor was significant in 
only one case. Apparently the differences in price 
estimates were not sufficiently large to affect the 
purchase recommendat ions, which were made on only an 
eleven-point scale.
The research also investigated the effect of the cue 
set format and subject expertise on the ability of subjects 
to correctly predict stock prices using mean square error 
and correlation achievement measures derived from the 
Brunswik lens model. The form in which the pension cue was 
presented affected the subjects' mean square prediction 
errors, their ability to correctly match an environmental 
model of information importance, and the consistency with 
which they applied their decisions models. subject 
achievement was significantly increased by the placement of
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pension information in the equivalent of a balance sheet 
position, rather than as a footnote. The effect was more 
pronounced for the student subjects than for the 
professional analysts. Overall, the subjects who received 
the footnote pension cue did not do as well as the subjects 
with the adjusted debt/asset ratio. However, differences 
were more pronounced between subjects with the footnote 
pension cue and the adjusted debt/asset ratio than between 
subjects with the pension cue in a balance sheet position 
and those who received an adjusted debt/asset ratio.
Subject expertise also affected the ability of 
subjects to predict stock prices. The financial analysts 
outperformed the student subjects on all measures of 
prediction achievement, except consistency, which was the 
expected result given their higher level of experience.
The only measurement on which differences were not 
significant was on the consistency with which subjects 
applied their linear models. However, performance 
differences between the students and financial analysts 
were reduced by the use of the balance sheet pension cue 
and the adjusted debt/asset ratio.
Research Implications
The results of the research indicates that the format 
in which pension information is presented has sone effect 
on users' stock price decisions and their ability to
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correctly estimate future stock prices. Subjects who 
received the pension information as a balance sheet 
equivalent made more accurate price predictions than 
subjects who received the pension footnote. Differences in 
achievement between subjects who received the pension 
information as a balance sheet equivalent and those who 
received an adjusted debt/asset ratio were not significant. 
These results support the FASB's position that recognition 
of pension information will be a "useful" change in the 
sense of improving financial statement users' abilities to 
estimate future stock prices. The inclusion of the pension 
cue in a balance sheet position was apparently easier for 
subjects to interpret.
The research results suggest that requiring 
recognition of net pension liabilities, but not net pension 
assets may impair the ability of financial statement users 
to evaluate companies for potential price appreciation.
The research did not find any evidence that when 
information on an overfunded plan was prominently 
displayed, subjects made different price predictions using 
pension information than they did using an adjusted 
debt/asset ratio. However, based on the results of the 
manipulation of the footnote and balance sheet cues, 
financial statement users might have more difficulty 
retrieving information from financial statement footnotes 
and integrating it into their decisions.
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The FASB based its position on pension accounting on 
the perceived needs of nonprofessional analysts although 
there was little evidence on differences between 
professional analysts and unsophisticated users with 
respect of their use of accounting information. The 
results of this study showed that while differences in the 
abilities of the two groups could not be eliminated by a 
change in reporting format, the relative differences could 
be reduced in this situation.
Limitations
SFAS 87 sets new standards for measurement and 
disclosure of pension information. The standard had not 
been implemented at the time the test cases were developed. 
Therefore, the data used in the cases reflected the 
limitations on disclosure and measurement effective under 
SFAS 36, and any conclusions drawn concerning the 
usefulness of pension information or its interpretabi1ity 
reflect those limitations.
The Brunswik lens model provides a well-developed 
theoretical framework in which to evaluate information 
usage, but its use does result in a somewhat artificial 
task. Information presented to the subjects was restricted 
to a predetermined set of cues, rather than a full set of 
financial statements. There was no way to determine, in 
the context of the present design, whether users
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sensitivity to pension information would change when they 
are provided a more complete set of information in 
financial statements. There is always the possibility that 
pension information is highly correlated with some other 
financial information and is not absolutely necessary in 
financial analysis.
Use of a limited set of cues, rather than full 
financial statements, required that surrogates be used for 
actual balance sheet recognition and footnote disclosures. 
Although the footnote pension information was presented as 
a note at the bottom of the questionnaire, the information 
was more prominently displayed than footnote disclosures in 
actual financial statements.
The study was designed only to assess similarities and 
differences in decision made by professional analysts and 
student subjects. Possible causal factors underlying the 
results such as familiarity with the task, task complexity, 
and psychological variables were not measured. This 
limited the explanations that could be offered for the 
results.
The hypotheses tested whether the subjects agreed in 
fact (the stock price predictions and purchase 
recommendations) rather than whether they agreed in 
principle (the means by which the information cues are 
weighed and combined in making decisions (Einhorn, 1974)). 
However, the use of alternative cue sets as a between-
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subject factor allowed inferences to be made about the 
effect of pension reporting on financial decisions without 
having to resort to the sometimes controversial process of 
examining the cue weights of individual decision models 
(Ashton, 1979, p. 171).
The research suffered from a low response rate of 
21.5%, although the response was in the range of what is 
normal for these types of studies (Green and Tull, 1978, p. 
15). However, there was no evidence of nonresponse bias 
based on the results of an early-late test.
The results of the profile analyses on the price 
prediction task and the purchase prediction task were not 
consistent. The significant effect of the cue set factor 
on the price prediction task did not carry over in general 
to the purchase recommendation task, even though responses 
were checked for consistency (i.e. higher recommendations 
on stocks with predicted price increases). This limits the 
external validity of the research because the effect of the 
experimental manipulation appeared sensitive to the task 
definition. There is no reason to assume that the effects 
found in this research would occur if a different type of 
user were studied in a different type of task, such as the 
assessment of risk and return in a lending situation.
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Future Research
The results of this research have an important 
implication for the design of future research projects.
The lack of stability of the pension cue factor across the 
two experimental tasks illustrates the need to continue to 
incorporate multiple tasks into human information 
processing research. Many accounting studies, especially 
those using the Brunswik lens model, have elicited only one 
type of decision from their subjects. Without using 
multiple tasks, there is no way to determine whether 
research results are peculiar to the particular 
experimental task. Other possible tasks include risk 
assessment and the determination of whether a stock is 
currently overvalued or undervalued. Analysis of these 
types of tasks are more limited because an objective 
environmental criteria against which to evaluate the 
effectiveness of a decision is lacking, but they would 
allow information usage to be studied in a variety of 
decision environments.
One area of future research is on the effect of the 
different standards of reporting of underfunded and 
overfunded pension plan3. Traditionally research concern 
has been on the effect of unrecognized obligations, such as 
leases, on decisions. In the current research, the pension 
information was prominently displayed and there was no way 
to determine whether users would search financial
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statements for unrecognized assets. As excess pension 
assets play an increasingly prominent role in corporate 
merger and acquisition activity, research on individual 
awareness of the information would be useful.
Finally, the current research served as a first step 
in studying the effect of pension reporting format on 
investment decisions. The effect now needs to be studied 
in a more realistic reporting environment with fuller sets 
of information.
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APPENDIX A
SAMPLE QUESTIONNAIRE WITH A FOOTNOTE PENSION DISCLOSURE
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Introduction:
On the following pages you have a limited set of 
information for 10 real companies. In order that your decisions 
be based solely on the information presented the name of the 
company, its industry affiliation, and the exact point in tims 
are not given, but all companies are large industrial firms 
that are publicly traded on the New York Stock Exchange.
Information presented was available as of mid- 
March, Year 1. For each company you are asked to:
1. Estimate the most likely price of its common stock 
one year later.
2. Recommend the stock for inclusion in a customer's 
portfolio based on your expectation of the stock's 
price appreciation over the one year period. Your 
purchase recommendation can be anywhere on a scale 
from 0--definitely would not recommend— to 10—  
definitely would recommend.
For the purpose of your decision, you may assume:
1. Ratios computed are based on audited financial 
statements.
2. The market was stable during the test period.
3. Prior research shows that stock prices are highly 
predictable with the given set of information.
4. Your purchase recommendation is Cor a client who is
a middle-aged business person and who currently 
holds a well-diversified portfolio.
Continued Next Page
The information items are explained below:
EPS
GROWTH
DEBT/ASSETS
R&D/ASSETS
BETA
LAST PRICE
Earnings per share for the prior fiscal 
(calendar) year--priiuary basis, 
excluding extraordinary items.
Arithmetic average of the percentage 
change in annual earnings, excluding 
extraordinary items, over the previous 
five years.
Ratio of long-term debt to total assets 
at the end of the prior year.
Ratio of the prior year expenditures on 
research and development to total assets 
at the end of the prior year.
Estimate of the ratio of the covariance 
of a security's rate of return with the 
market average divided by the variance 
of the rate of return of the market 
average.
Closing price of the company's common 
stock on the Wednesday of the second 
week of March, Y4ar 1.
Continued Next Page
ch case independently:
Casa 1
EPS
GROWTH 
••DEBT/ASSETS 
R4D/ASSBTS 
BETA
LAST PRICE
Host likely pries as 
of Wsdnssday, 2nd week 
of March, Tear 2
Purchase Recoaaendation 
(anywhere froa I— definitely 
do not recoaaend to 
ll--definitely recoaaend 
for purchase)
festasU (IkIm sh  y a tW  IH sa lla  ss Us ratis 
t( a la M  fSMlia ISMttU U itUl (in  uasti si Us 
«4 •( Us p la  f«w. 1W nil* it sesitiff K Us 
Starlit f |«  It MtrltaSsS ad ss|tti«t ii Us flit it
(5.31
it
.12
.•4
l.ll
(54.375
. 89
Casa 2 Casa Casa 4 Casa 5
i
-S3.34 (2. It tl.tl -12.#4
211 -7% 2#t -2#t
.34 .2# .21 .34
.12 .12 .14 .#7
1.4# .11 1.11 .9#
:
(14.375 (41.25 (32.175 (41.75
( ( ( (
; -.11 #9 . 12 -.1#
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Pleaae evaluate aach caBa independently:
Caaa i
BPS
GROWTH 
“ DEBT/ASSETS 
R6D/ASSRTS 
BETA
LAST PRICE
Moat likely ptlca as 
of Wednesday, 2nd weak 
of Harch, Year 2
purchase Recoaaendation 
(anywhere froa (--definitely 
do not racoaaend to 
lS-^afini taly recoaaend 
for purchase)
FeetHt* iiK lM erH  praviM  iilaraatiaa m tie n t i i  
• i  a l a M  paeaiia baaaf Ita t* fatal lira  aaiat* at tka 
» i  at tka pa tea p a r . Tka ra tla  I t  pealtlva II tka 
pattias pita l i  narlwW d a d  aapatlti H tka pita i t
I
$6.7
23
.1
.«
1.1
$66.7
.89
Cate 7 Casa B Casa 9 Casa II
91.21 $1.35 ; $6.49 j $3.75
; 1 ;
27% : -31 : St 111
.17 .21 .11 : .23
.•« .12 .13 .16
l.ll .91 l.ll 1.11
$91.11 : $29.75 : $66,625 : $41.25
$______ ! $______  : $______  i $_____
-23 : -.85 : .16 : .11
APPENDIX B 
SAMPLE QUESTIONNAIRE WITH A PENSION CUE
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Introduction:
On the following page* you have a limited sat of 
information for 10 raal companies. in ordar that your dacisions 
bo baaad aolaly on the Information praaantad tha name of the 
company, Ita lnduatry affiliation, and tha axact point in time 
are not given, but all coapanlas are largo Industrial fi rms 
that are publicly traded on tha New York Stock exchange.
Information praaantad was available aa of mid- 
March, Year 1. For aacb coapany you are asked to:
1. estimate the aoat likely price of ita common stock 
one year later.
2. Recoaaend tha stock for inclusion in a customer's 
portfolio based on your expectation of tha stock's 
price appreciation over the one year period. Your 
purchase recommendation can be anywhere on a scale 
from 0— definitely would not recoaaend— to 10—  
definitely would recoaaend.
For the purpose of your decision, you may assume:
1. Ratios computed are based oi} audited financial 
statements.
2. The market was stable during the test period.
3. Prior research shows that stock prices are highly 
predictable with the given set of information.
4. Your purchase recommendation is for a client who is 
a middle-aged business person and who currently 
holds a well-diversified portfolio.
Continued Next Page
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The information 
EPS
GROWTH
DEBT/ASSETS
PENSION/ASSETS
R&D/ASSETS 
BETA
LAST PRICE
items are explained below:
Earnings per share for the prior fiscal 
(calendar) year— primary basis, 
excluding extraordinary items. -
Arithmetic average of the percentage 
change in annual earnings, excluding 
extraordinary items, over the previous 
five years.
Ratio of lonq-term debt to total assets 
at the end of the prior year.
Ratio of unfunded pension benefits to 
total assets at the end of the prior 
year. The ratio will be positive if the 
plan is overfunded and negative if the 
plan is underfunded.
Ratio of the prior year expenditures on 
research and development to total assets 
at the end of the prior year.
Estimate of the ratio of the covariance 
of a security's rate of return with the 
market average divided by the variance 
of the rate of return of the market 
average .
Closing price of the company's common 
stock on the Wednesday of the second 
week of March, Year 1.
Continued Next page
please evaluate each caaa Independently:
Caaa 1
BPS $5.3}
GROWTH (%
DBBT/ASSETS ; .12
PENSION/ASSETS .(9
R4D/ASSETS .14
BETA 1.(I
LAST PRICE $54,375
Moat likely price aa
of Wednesday, 2nd week :
of March, Year 2 : $______
Purchase Recoaaendation 
(anywhere froe (--definitely 
do not recoaaend to 
l(--deflnitely recoaaend 
for purchase!
Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case
: -$3.34 ; $2.19 $1. B0 -$2.(4
; 2(4 -71 216 -2(t
.34 i .21 .21 .34
; -.11 ; -.(9 .12 -.1*
.(2 .12 .(4 .17
1.6# .61 1.11 . 9fl
$14,375 ; $41.25 $32,675 $41.75
i  $  ! * $ $
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Please evaluate each case independently:
Case 6
GPS : 88.73
GROWTH : 23%
DEBT/ASSETS .12
PENSION/ASSETS ; .19
RID/ASSETS .11
BETA 1.15
LAST PRICE : 886.75
Host likely price as
of Wednesday, 2nd week
of March, Year 2 ; 8____
Purchase Recoaaendatian 
(anywhere froa I— definitely 
do not recoaaend to 
It— definitely recoaaend 
for purchase!
Case Case 8 Case 9 Case II
; 88.21 81.35 88.49 83.75
271 -3% 5% 14%
: .17 .11 .23
: -.23 .18 .11
.14 .13 .16
1.18 l.ll 1.11
891.II 829.75 888.825 841.25
1 8 8 8 8
1 
64
APPENDIX C
SAMPLE QUESTIONNAIRE WITH ADJUSTED DEBT/ASSET CUE
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introduction:
On the following pages you have a limited sat of 
inforaation foe 10 raal coapanias. in ordar that your decisions 
ba based solely on the inforaation presented the naae of the 
company, its industry affiliation, and the exact point in time 
are not given, but all coapanias are large industrial firms 
that are publicly traded on the New York Stock Exchange.
Inforaation presented was available as of mid- 
March, Year 1. For each company you are asked to:
1. Estimate the most likely price of its common stock 
one year later.
2. Recoaaend the stock for inclusion In a customer's 
portfolio based on your expectation of the stock's 
price appreciation over the one year period. Your 
purchase recoaaendation can be anywhere on a scale 
froa 0— • definitely would not recoaaend— to 10—  
definitely would recoaaend.
For the purpose of your decision, you may assume:
1. Ratios coaputed are based on audited financial 
statements.
2. The market was stable during the test period.
3. Prior research shows that stock prices are highly 
predictable with the given set of information.
4. Your purchase recommendation is for a client who is 
a middle-aged business person and who currently 
holds a well-diversified portfolio.
Continued Next Page
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The information 
EPS
GROWTH
ADJ. DEBT/ASSETS
R&D/ASSETS 
BETA
LAST PRICE
items are explained below:
Earnings per share for the prior fiscal 
(calendar) year--primary basis, 
excluding extraordinary items.
Arithmetic average of the percentage 
change in annual earnings, excluding 
extraordinary items, over the previous 
five years.
Ratio of long-term debt to total assets 
at the end of the prior year. Long-term 
debt has been adjusted to reflect 
certain footnote disclosures such as the 
funded status of the company's pension 
plan .
Ratio of the prior year expenditures on 
research and development to total assets 
at the end of the prior year.
Estimate of the ratio of the covariance 
of a security's rate of return with the 
market average divided by the variance 
of the rate of return of the market 
average.
Closing price of the company's common 
stock on the Wednesday of the second 
week of March, Year 1.
Continued Next Page
ch case independently;
C l M  1
BPS $5
GROWTH
ADJ. DEBT/ASSETS
RAD/ASSETS
BETA 1
LAST PRICE $54
Host likely price n  
of Wednesday, 2nd week 
of March, year 2 $
purchase Recoaaendation
Itnywbtte fco» 0--definitely ■
do not ctcoMtnd to 
l R - ^ f i n i t e l y  [tcoaitnd 
for purchase)
Caaa 2 Caaa 3 Caaa 4 Casa 5
-$3.3* f 2.09 11.00 -12.04
# • *
a ■ a
2*0 -7% 20% -20%
; : :
.47 .29 -09 : .44
■ a *
.02 .02 -04 .07
: : :
1.60 .00 1.10 .90
: : i
$14.375 ; $41.29 : $32,075 : $41.75
: : :
: i t
: : s
: : :
$  : $  : $  : $______
Cotit lnutd Next palje 1
6
8
Pi ch case independently;
Caaa 6
BPS : $<.73
GROWTH ; 231
ADJ. DBBT/ASSETS : .13
RAD/ASSRTS .11
BETA 1.15
LAST PRICE ; $66.75
Host likely price as
of Wednesday, 2nd weak
of March, Year 2 : $_______
Purchase Recoaaendation 
(anywhere froa • — definitely 
do not recoaaend to 
18--definitely recoaaend 
for purchase)
Caaa Case B Caaa 9 Casa IB
: $8.21 $1.35 $6.49 $3.75
27%
;
-31 5% 14%
.48 .25 .84 .12
.•4 .82 .83 .86
1.81 .98 1.88 1.18
$91.SB $29.75 $66,625 $41.25
i $ $ $ $
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DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONS FOR STUDENT SUBJECTS
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Th« following questions are asksd so that wa can compare your 
answers to other students with similar backgrounds.
1. What was your undergraduate major or area of concentration? 
(please fill in the blank)
2. From what college or university did you obtain your 
undergraduate degree?
Name of Qnlvarsity
City, State ___________________________________
3. How many undergraduate and graduate accounting courses have 
you taken (include the current semester)? (please circle one 
total)
a . 0 to 2
b. 3 to 5
c. 6 to 10
d. over 10
4. How many undergraduate and graduate finance courses have you 
taken (include the currant semester)? (please circle one total)
a. 0 to 2
b. 3 to 5
c. 6 to 10
d. over 10
5. How many years of business experience have you had? (please 
circle one)
a . 0
b. l to 2
c. 3 to 5
d. 6 to 10
e. over 10
6. Do you have any professional certification? (please circle 
one)
a . CPA
b. CPA
c. other (please specify)___________ _______________________
End of Questionnaire. Thank you very much.
APPENDIX
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The following questions are asked so that we can compare your 
answers to other analysts with similar experience.
1. What Is the highest educational level that you completed? 
(please circle one)
a. high school
b. some college
c. bachelors degree Major/concentration
d . masters degree
or higher Major/concentration________________
2. What is the major line of business of your firm? (please 
circle one)
a. brokerage firm
b. investment banking
c. commercial banking
d . financial planning
e. other (please specify)_______________________________
3. How many years experience have you had in financial analysis? 
(please circle one)
a . 0 to 2
b. 3 to 5
c. 6 to 10
d . over 10
*
4. Do you have any professional certification? (please circle 
one)
a. CFA
b. CPA
c. other (please specify)_________________________________
End of Questionnaire. Thank you very much.
Please return the questionnaire in the envelope enclosed.
APPENDIX F
GROUP MEANS OF STOCK PRICE PREDICTIONS
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AFFBNDIX P
GROUP NBAMS FOR STOCK PRICB PREDICTIONS
CSSS 1 C O I  Bit r o w r Row
ft ba adj/D N e o n
EXFRftTlSfc
S S A B . 37 $59.55 SS8.BE $59.31
PA ( S B . 68 653.89 $57.63 $56.65
Colunn
Mean $59.51 $56.54 $ 5 7 . B6 $57.95
Casa 2 e w m  FAfcKXi ■ ■ low
Haanft ba ad V o
i
EXPERTISE
$15.64 $13.57 ; $17.67
:
$15.67 :
:
S
FA $15.99 $14.58 $16.95 $15.81 1
C O l U M
ftaan $15.82 $14.11 $17.31 $15.74 :
Case 3 CUB SET PORHAT Row
Meanft ba ad}/D
EXPERTISE
$34.12 $34.67 $37.26 $35.26S
PA $36.83 $37.76 $39.35 $37.99
Coluan
Mean $35.58 $36.63 $38.31 $36.63
Casa 4 CUB SET PORHAT ROW
Haanft ba adl/D
BXPRRTISB
$39.38 $38.31 $39.14 $38.95&
PA $39.83 $36.39 $37.73 $37.93
Col U M  
Mean $39.61 $37.29 $38.44 $3B.43
APPENDIX P CONTINUBD
Case 5 COB SBT PORHAT ROW
ft bs adj/D Haan
EXPERTISE
S $25.37 $33.77 $34.27 $31.2B
PA $31.52 $37.66 $36.59 $35.13
Column
Mean $28.SB $35.52 $35.43 $13.22
Case 7 CUE SET PORHAT ROW
ft bs adl/D Mean
EXPERTISE
S $114.55 $116.28 $112.18 $111.83 :
PA $84.11 $96.58 $112.55 $94.54 :
Column
Mean $94.12 $185.81 $1»7.37 $182.57 :
Case 6 COE SET 'PORHAT ROW
Haanft bs adl/D
EXPERTISE
$98.32 $98.99 $86.89 $89.87&
PA $78.66 $72.79 $73.18 $74.77
Column
Haan $84.39 $81.32 $79.59 $81.73
Case 8 CUE SET PORHAT ROW
ft ba adj/D Haan
EXPERTISE
S $21.44 $24.27 $26.52 $24.13 :
PA $25.98 $28.56 $28.19 $27.61 ;
Column
Mean $23.74 $26.55 $27.36 $25.92 :
APPENDIX r CONTINUED
Case 9 c u e  SET PdRHAf Bow
ft ba adj/D Haan
EXPERTISE
S $78.11 $72.18 $78.38 $78.87
FA $71.81 $69.43 $89.69 $78.28
Coluan
Mean $78.97 $78.71 $78.84 $78.57
Caaa 18 a»F"8W~MfcHXf Row
Haanf t ba adj/D
BXPERTISB
$58.95 $48.75 $47.52 $49.84ft
FA $45.28 $47.44 $43.76 $45.54
Coluan 
Haan $48.87 $48.BS $45.64 $47.24
APPENDIX G
GROUP MEANS FOR PURCHASE RECOMMENDATIONS
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a p p e n d i x  g
"g r o u p m e a n s f or p u r c h a s e  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s
Casa 1 Cflt SEt fORHAT ROW
Haanft ba adj/D
EXPERTlSI
4.14 5.24 5.13 5.07S
FA 6.73 7.27 6. 28 6.77
Coluan
Mean 5.6# 6.32 5.71 5.94
Caaa 2 COE SET PORHAT Row
ft ba adj/D Haan
EXPERTISE
~~a...... 2.42 2.32 2.44 2.39
FA 2.91 3.60 5.00 3.04
Coluan
Haan 2.66 3.10 3.72 3.14
Case 3 CUB SET FORMAT Row
Hean
Casa 4 CUB SET FORHAT Row
Haanft ba adj/D ft ba adj/D
EXPERTISE
0.97 1.44 0. 47 0.95
EXPERTISE
6.74 6. 38 7.50 6.09' s S
FA 2.23 2. 40 2. 26 2. 31 FA 7.03 6.57 7.41 6.99
Coluan
Mean 1.61 1 .95 1. 38 1.65
Coluan
hean 6.89 6.48 7.46 6.94
*On a scale ot B through IB (0--def1n 11e 1 y would not 
tccuniBe/id; 1 B*-dtfinitely would recoaaend)
APPENDIX C CONTINUED
Case 5 CdE SET PORHAT ROW
(t bs adj/D Haan
EXPERTISE
S • .It *. 55 #.47 • .4# :
PA a. ti 1.33 1. #3 l.il :
Coluan
Hean i . n #.96 1.75 #.71 :
Case 7 C M  SIT FORMAT ROW
HeanIt ba adj/D
EXPERTISE
8. 26 8. 47 8.69 8.48 :S
PA 7.U3 6. 63 7.75 7.38 :
Coluan
Hean 8. #4 7.49 8.22 7.92 :
Case t COB SET PORHAT Row
ft bs adj/D * Haan
EXPERTISE
S 8. 58 8.97 9.31 8.9t
PA 8.13 7.87 7.97 7.98
Coluan
Naan 8. 35 8.39 8.64 8.46
Casa 8 CUE SET PORHAT ROW
Haanft bs adj/D
EXPERTISE
a.58 1.47 1.32 1.13 :S
FA 1.93 2.68 2. 58 2.35 ;
Coluan
Hean 1.27 2.87 1.91 1.76 :
APPENDIX G CONTINUED
Case 9 - coi s n  p o w x t " ROW
Hean
Caaa 19 ~ m  H V  MBJttf Bow
Haanft ba adj/D ft ba adj/D
EXPERTISE
4.96 4.79 4.53 4.46
EXPERTISE
6.26 6.47 6.79 6.51 :S S
PA 5.7R 6.59 5.41 5.99 PA 6.53 7.47 6.56 6.97 I
Coluan
Hean 4.89 5.78 4.97 5.19
Coluan
Haan 6.49 7.99 6.67 6.69 :
APPENDIX H
ENVIRONMENTAL LINEAR MODELS 
AND STANDARDIZED REGRESSION WEIGHTS
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ENVIRONMENTAL LINEAR MODELS 
AND STANDARDIZED REGRESSION WEIGHTS*
Model 1
Actual
Market Value - 4.00 EPS + .69 GROWTH - 1.29 DEBT
t-value 
tp < )
-7.11 
(.019 )
3.16 
t .087)
-2 . 86 
( .100 )
- .66 PENS + .56 RDEV - .72 BETA
t-value 
(p < )
-4 . 54 
(.045)
3.41 
{ . 076 )
-3 . 74 
(. 065 }
+ 2.41 LAST PRICE
t-value 
(p < )
8. 50 
t.013)
Overall F 28.49, P < .03
Model 2
Actual
Market Value - 3.42 EPS + .56 GROWTH - 1.17ADJ/DEBT
t-va1ue 
(p < )
-6.69 
< . 007 )
2 . 29 
< . 106 }
-6. 35 
( . 008 )
34 RDEV - .77 BETA + 2.44 LAST PRICE
t-value 
(p < )
3 . 88 
(.043)
-3 . 34 
(.044)
7 .14 
(. 005 )
Overall F 22 . 38, j- < .01
*For purposes of determining regression weights, the 
pension cue values were positive for underfunded plans and 
negative for overfunded plans. As a result, the pension 
cue had a negative sign in the regression equation like the 
debt cue. Underfunded plans had a negative effect on firm 
value and overfunded plans had a positive effect on firm 
va1ue .
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